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Voice and data have been traditionally carried on different types of networks based on 
different technologies, namely, circuit switching and packet switching respectively. Convergence 
in networks enables carrying voice, video, and other data on the same packet-switched 
infrastructure, and provides various services related to these kinds of data in a unified way. 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) stands out as the standard that benefits from convergence by 
carrying voice calls over the packet-switched infrastructure of the Internet. 
Although sharing the same physical infrastructure with data networks makes convergence 
attractive in terms of cost and management, it also makes VoIP environments inherit all the 
security weaknesses of Internet Protocol (IP). In addition, VoIP networks come with their own 
set of security concerns. Voice traffic on converged networks is packet-switched and vulnerable 
to interception with the same techniques used to sniff other traffic on a Local Area Network 
(LAN) or Wide Area Network (WAN). Denial of Service attacks (DoS) are among the most 
critical threats to VoIP due to the disruption of service and loss of revenue they cause. VoIP 
systems are supposed to provide the same level of security provided by traditional Public 
Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs), although more functionality and intelligence are 
distributed to the endpoints, and more protocols are involved to provide better service. A new 
design taking into consideration all the above factors with better techniques in Intrusion 
Detection are therefore needed. 
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a host-based Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) that targets VoIP environments. Our intrusion detection system combines two 
types of modules for better detection capabilities, namely, a specification-based and a signature-
based module. Our specification-based module takes the specifications of VoIP applications and 
protocols as the detection baseline. Any deviation from the protocol’s proper behavior described 
by its specifications is considered anomaly. The Communicating Extended Finite State Machines 
model (CEFSMs) is used to trace the behavior of the protocols involved in VoIP, and to help 
exchange detection results among protocols in a stateful and cross-protocol manner. The 











used to model and detect computer penetrations. Both detection modules allow for protocol-
syntax and protocol-semantics awareness. Our intrusion detection uses the aforementioned 
techniques to cover the threats propagated via low-level protocols such as IP, ICMP, UDP, and 
TCP. 
An intrusion detection prototype is implemented using a network simulator for proof-of-
concept of the proposed architecture. The network simulator is also used to launch a variety of 
attacks against hosts equipped with our IDS. The system shows excellent hit rate and performs 
well under both low- and high-load conditions causing little overhead to the network. The 
performance of the network is not impeded or degraded in any way that badly affects the Quality 
of Service (QoS). The results presented in this thesis show that the IDS has only a minor impact 
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Access Control: Protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a process by which 
use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted by only 
authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy. 
AOR: An Address Of Record (AOR) is a SIP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to a 
domain with a location service that can map the URI to another URI where the user might be 
available. Typically, the location service is populated through registrations. An AOR is 
frequently thought of as the “public address” of the user. 
Authentication: The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity. 
Authorization: An authorization is a right or a permission that is granted to a system entity to 
access a system resource. An authorization process is a procedure for granting such rights. 
Availability: The property of a system or a system resource being accessible and usable upon 
demand by an authorized system entity, according to performance specifications for the system; 
i.e., a system is available if it provides services according to the system design whenever users 
request them. 
CODEC (Coder/Decoder): Hardware or software that converts analogue signals (e.g., video, 
audio) to or from digital form for transmission or storage. It may perform compression or other 
optimizations such as silence suppression. 
Cryptography: The study of ways to convert information from its normal, comprehensible form 
into an obscured guise, unreadable without special knowledge. 
CSRC: Contributing Source is a source of a stream of RTP packets that has contributed to the 
combined stream produced by an RTP mixer. 
Data Integrity: The property that data have not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an 











DoS: A Denial-of-Service attack is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its 
intended users. 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System is software/hardware that detects and logs inappropriate, 
incorrect, or anomalous activity. 
IETF: The Internet Engineering Task Force is the body that defines standard Internet operating 
protocols such as TCP/IP. The IETF is supervised by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). 
Standards are expressed in the form of Requests for Comments (RFCs). 
IP Softphones: IP Softphone makes it easy to place and receive phone calls on your PC or 
laptop, making it ideal for working from any location with an internet connection. 
ITU-T: The Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International Telecommunication 
Union is the primary international body for fostering cooperative standards for 
telecommunications equipment and systems. It was formerly known as the CCITT. 
Jitter: The variation in the time between packets arriving caused by network congestion, timing 
drift, or route change. Queuing delay and processing time experienced by each packet are the 
main contributors to jitter. 
LAN: A Local Area Network (LAN) is a group of computers and associated devices that share a 
common communications line or wireless link. 
Mixer: An intermediate system that receives RTP packets from one or more sources, possibly 
changes the data format, combines the packets in some manner and then forwards a new RTP 
packet. 
Mobile ad-hoc network: A mobile ad-hoc network is a kind of wireless ad-hoc network, and is 
a self-configuring network of mobile routers (and associated hosts) connected by wireless links – 
the union of which forms an arbitrary topology. 
OLSR: The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) is an IP routing protocol specified 











wireless ad-hoc networks. 
Packetization: The process of filling a packet payload with encoded/compressed data. It 
transforms a native IP core transaction into packets. 
PSTN: Public Switched Telephone Network is an umbrella term that represents the carriers that 
make up the worldwide telephone service. 
RFC: Request For Comments is a memorandum published by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) describing methods, behaviors, research, or innovations applicable to the working 
of the Internet and Internet-connected systems. 
Serialization: The process of clocking a voice or data frame onto the network interface. It is 
directly related to the clock rate on the trunk. 
SLA: A Service Level Agreement is a formally negotiated agreement between two parties such 
as customers and their service providers. It may specify the levels of availability, serviceability, 
performance, operation, or other attributes of the service like billing and even penalties in the 
case of violation of the SLA. 
SPIT: SPam over Internet Telephony is unsolicited bulk messages broadcast over VoIP to 
phones connected to the Internet. 
URI: A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact string of characters used to identify or 
name a resource on the I ternet. The main purpose of this identification is to enable interaction 
with representations of the resource over a network, typically the World Wide Web, using 
specific protocols. 
Virus: A computer virus is a program that copies itself into (infects) other programs. It may or 
may not perform other tasks. It can be passed by infected files on a disk, by files download from 
another computer, or by attachments sent via e-mail. 
WAN: A Wide Area Network is a geographically dispersed telecommunications network. The 











WiMAX: Also known as the IEEE 802.16 group of standards, defines a packet-based wireless 
technology that provides high-throughput broadband connections over long distances. 
Worm: A computer worm is a program that spawns running copies of itself over a computer 
network and usually performs malicious actions, such as using up the computer’s resources and 











Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems: Definitions and Taxonomies 
The threat of intruding into computer systems is gaining momentum in today’s 
interconnected networks. Due to the rise in connectivity, more and more systems are subject to 
attacks by intruders. Anderson, who introduced the concept of intrusion detection in 1980  [1], 
defined an intrusion attempt or a threat to be the potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized 
attempt to: 
1. Access information, 
2. Manipulate information, or 
3. Render a system unreliable or unusable. 
The role of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to detect such attempts, and to inform 
system administrators about such threats in order to take countermeasures. 
Although many attacks and intrusions can be prevented if proper authentication and 
cryptographic methods are used, inevitably, the best intrusion prevention system will fail. 
Therefore, intrusion detection systems should be used as a second line of defense with intrusion 
prevention systems to provide a securer environment. The significance of IDSs stems from many 
factors including the following: 
1. Building a completely secure system is still a dream far from being realized.  Software 
reuse, relying on Internet protocols designed without security awareness in mind, and the 
need to connect to outsiders make the job extremely difficult. 
2. Cryptographic methods have their own problems. Passwords can be cracked, users can lose 
their passwords, and entire crypto-systems can be broken  [2]. 











4. An effective intrusion detection system can serve as a deterrent, so acting to prevent 
intrusions. 
5. Intrusion detection enables the collection of information about the intrusion techniques that 
can be used to strengthen the intrusion prevention facility  [3]. 
1.1.1 Classification of Attacks and Intrusions 
Since intrusion detection systems deal with the threat of attacks and intrusions, it is in 
order to take a closer look at these dangerous activities. The intent is to provide a better 
understanding of attacks that an organization or an individual may need to counter. 
Based on their effect, attacks can be categorized as passive and active attacks. Passive 
attacks try to obtain information that is being transmitted without altering or affecting system 
resources. Therefore, they violate the confidentiality rules of the system. Passive attacks are 
accomplished by monitoring a system performing its tasks and collecting information regarding 
its operation. Once this information is collected, it may be used later to attack the same system or 
one related to it. There are several types of passive attacks, however, we mention two of the most 
prevalent ones, namely, eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Eavesdropping is accomplished by 
monitoring traffic passing through a network, and aims at revealing the contents of the messages 
being transmitted. Eavesdropping attempts can be blocked if the contents of the transmitted 
messages are properly encrypted. Traffic analysis is another type of passive attacks where an 
opponent tries to determine the nature of the messages being exchanged and the identities of the 
communicating parties by observing the pattern of the messages. Traffic analysis could be 
accomplished even if encryption is applied to the contents of messages. 
Active attacks on the other hand attempt to alter system resources or affect their 
operation violating several security services such as authentication, access control, data integrity, 
and availability. Some of the most common types of active attacks include masquerade, message 
content modification, and denial of service. A masquerade attack is a type of attack in which one 
system entity illegitimately poses as another entity to gain access to confidential systems. In 
message content modification attacks the attacker removes a message from the wire, modifies it, 











service attacks are incidents in which legitimate users are deprived of the services of a resource 
they would normally expect to have. Denial of service attacks can be accomplished by disabling 
the network or overloading it with messages so as to degrade performance. The severity of 
Denial of Service attacks vary from making the victim unresponsive for a few seconds to causing 
serious damage such as crashes and reboots. 
Another possible classification of attacks is the one based on the origin of the attack. In 
this context attacks can be classified as internal or external. Internal attacks are originated from 
the enterprise own employees, business partners, customers, or any entity that has an authorized 
access to some of the enterprise resources. External attacks on the other hand come from outside, 
usually via the Internet or a Wide Area Network (WAN)  [73]. 
1.1.2 Classification of Intrusion Detection Principles 
Intrusion detection systems can be classified based on the detection principle into three 
























Figure 1-1. The three main approaches in intrusion detection 
1.1.2.1 Anomaly-based Detection 











deviation from normal system or user behavior. Anomaly detection’s philosophy is that, if we 
could establish a normal profile for a system, we could in principle report all system states 
varying from the normal profile as intrusion attempts. Anomaly-based detection has the 
advantage of detecting previously-unknown attacks but at the cost of relatively high false alarm 
rate, which is due to the fact that systems often exhibit legitimate but previously-unseen 
behavior. These false alarms are indicated as false positives in Figure 1.1. The main issues in 
anomaly detection are to select the threshold upon which we measure the deviation from the 
normal profile and to select the features to monitor. 
1.1.2.2 Signature-based Detection 
 Instead of modeling the system’s normal behavior, signature-based detection technique 
models intrusive behaviors in the form of patterns or signatures. Consequently, such signatures 
are used by the system to distinguish between normal and anomalous behavior. A signature is a 
pattern that we look for in traffic received or activities performed by a system. For example, if 
administrators want to ban a certain IP address from establishing a connection with monitored 
systems, that IP address could serve as a pattern we look for in incoming packets. Another more 
complex example could be a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on a mail server with the attack 
issuing the same command thousands of times. A possible signature for such attacks is to count 
how many times the command is issued and raise an alarm when that number of times exceeds a 
certain threshold. Signature detection is capable of detecting all known attack patterns, but is of 
little use for unknown ones, as no signatures are available for such attacks  [4]. The failure to 
detect such unknown attacks is indicated as false negatives in Figure 1.1. The main issue in 
signature-based detection is to write a signature that encompasses all possible variations of a 
certain attack and does not match non-intrusive behavior. 
1.1.2.3 Specification-based Detection 
A third technique that has been overtaking both previous approaches is intrusion 
detection by static program analysis which was first proposed by Wagner and Dean  [5]. This 
technique performs a static analysis of the program to create an abstract automata model of the 
functions and system calls. The program’s behavioral specifications are used to create the model 











call which violates the model, the IDS assumes that an intruder has corrupted the program. This 
approach has become more mature with the inputs of Balepin et al  [7] and has had the name 
specification-based intrusion detection. Specification-based technique has the capacity to detect 
previously-unseen attacks with the lowest false alarm rate. This advantage is due to the 
programmatic nature of the IDS which contains a model that represents all possible legal paths 
through the program or the protocol session ensuring that any detected deviation from the model 
is not caused by the program’s code but by code inserted by a bug or an attacker. In a narrow 
sense, specification-based detection means looking for behavior in network traffic that is 
peculiar in terms of the specification for the protocol the traffic is using. In this case, detection is 
interested in syntax violation. In a broader sense, the term could mean applying anomaly 
detection on the semantics of traffic as expressed using the protocol. In this approach, traffic is 
not peculiar due to a particular protocol element it is using, but rather what in aggregate it is 
trying to achieve with the protocol. Semantics violations are the main concern here  [8]. Despite 
their obvious advantages, specification-based systems are not very effective against certain types 
of attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) and failed logins. 
Other types of intrusion detection systems can be safely classified under any of the 
abovementioned three main approaches.  
1.1.2.4 Statistical Detection 
Another name for this type of detection is Threshold detection. Statistical detection is one 
of the most rudimentary forms of intrusion detection. The goal of this type of detection is to 
record each occurrence of a specific event and detect when the number of occurrences of that 
event surpasses a reasonable amount that one might expect to occur within a specified time 
period. As the monitored system continues running, the statistical monitor builds a profile of 
normal statistical behavior by collecting descriptive statistics on a number of parameters. Such 
parameters can be the number of unsuccessful logins, the number of network connections, and 
the number of commands with error returns. Although statistical approaches have the advantage 
of adaptively learning the behavior of users and systems, they can gradually be trained by 
intruders so that eventually, intrusive behavior is considered normal. Furthermore, false positives 











Statistical detection can be considered a branch of anomaly detection. 
1.1.2.5 Expert Systems 
Expert systems contain a set of rules that describe attacks. Such rules are usually 
formulated by a security professional. A security professional translates the events of the system 
audit trail into facts and rules, which are used by the IDS inference engine to draw conclusions 
on system activities. This method increases the abstraction level of the audit data by attaching a 
semantic to it  [64]. The rules of an expert system are as strong as the security personnel who 
program them, and hence there is a real chance that expert systems can fail to flag intrusions. 
Expert systems are considered signature-based detection systems. 
1.1.2.6 Model-based Detection 
Model-based intrusion detection systems attempt to model either proper or intrusive 
behaviors at a higher level of abstraction than audit records. The objective is to build scenario 
models that represent the characteristic behavior of systems or intrusions. The philosophy of this 
approach is that certain scenarios are inferred by certain other observable activities. If these 
activities are monitored, it is possible to find intrusion attempts by looking at activities that infer 
a certain intrusion scenario. Model-based systems can predict the attacker’s next move based on 
the intrusion model, which allows security officers to take preventive measures. However, 
patterns for intrusion scenarios must be easily recognized and must not be associated with any 
other normal behavior. Model-based approaches can be used to implement specification-based 
and signature-based intrusion detection systems, however they differ from signature-based 
approaches in that they do not simply pattern match audit records to expert signatures  [9]. 
1.1.3 Classification of the Monitored Resources 
Considering the resources they monitor, IDSs can also be differentiated into the 
following popular categories: 
1.1.3.1 Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
NIDSs are placed at strategic points within the network such as inside a firewall, outside 
it, or at the perimeter of a network. Their aim is to monitor traffic to and from all devices on the 











create a bottleneck that would impair the overall performance of the network. Therefore, 
researchers have been devising new methods to improve memory management and packet 
processing capabilities in NIDSs. Figure 1.2 shows a very basic but common scheme which is 








Figure 1-2. Typical deployment scheme of a network intrusion detection system 
1.1.3.2 Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) 
HIDSs are installed locally on host machines. They evaluate the activities and access to 
individual hosts or devices in the network. HIDSs are usually placed at business critical hosts 
and external servers. Four different types of host intrusion detection systems can be recognized 
in the literature. 
1. File system monitors which check the integrity of files and directories. 
2. Log file analyzers which analyze log files for patterns indicating suspicious activities. 
3. Connection analyzers which monitor connection attempts to and from a host. 



































Figure 1-3. Taxonomies of Intrusions and Intrusion Detection Systems 
1.1.4 Measurable Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Characteristics of IDSs can be measured quantitatively. Some of these characteristics are: 
1. Coverage: Determines which types of attacks the IDS can detect under ideal conditions. 
2. Probability of false alarms: Determines the rate of false alarms produced by an IDS in a 
given environment during a particular time frame. A false alarm is an alert caused by normal 
non-malicious background traffic. 
3. Hit rate: Determines the rate of attacks detected correctly by an IDS in a given environment 
during a particular time frame. 
4. Ability to handle high bandwidth traffic: Demonstrates how well an IDS will function when 
presented with a large volume of traffic. 
5. Ability to detect novel attacks: Demonstrates how well an IDS can detect attacks that have 











1.2 Convergence and VoIP: Advantages and Security Implications 
Convergence in networks refers to the structures and processes that result from design 
and implementation of a common networking infrastructure that accommodates data, voice, and 
multimedia communications  [11]. Network convergence is the first step towards application 
convergence which happens above the network layer. Convergence in applications refers to the 
building of applications that span over different protocols/specifications  [12]. Voice over IP 
(VoIP) is emerging as a standard that benefits from convergence and replaces older PSTN 
systems. 
From a management and maintenance point of view, VoIP networks and applications are 
less expensive than two separate telecommunications infrastructures. Although implementation 
can be expensive at the beginning, it is repaid in the form of lower operating costs and easier 
administration. For example, a single management station or cluster can be used to monitor both 
data and voice components and performance. However, this reliance upon the infrastructure 
provided by data networks makes VoIP susceptible to all the security flaws suffered by IP based 
applications. Furthermore, VoIP comes with its own challenges. 
VoIP standards separate signaling and media on different channels. These channels run 
over dynamic IP address/port combinations and are controlled by different protocols each with 
its own security issues. In addition, VoIP distributes applications and services throughout the 
network. IP phones which are considered smart devices, can act as clients for a number of 
network protocols which means that more processing capabilities and intelligence are shifted to 
the edge of the network. It also dramatically increases the number of systems to be protected. 
This model is a reversal of the traditional security model, where critical data are centralized, 
bounded, and protected.  
PSTN networks provided security via obscurity. The use of closed standards and 
proprietary solutions made it hard for attackers to penetrate such networks. In contrast, VoIP 
standards have a tendency towards openness and simplicity which gives attackers the 
opportunity to manipulate the protocols used to their advantage and use their very features to 











remain the most difficult VoIP threat to defend against  [8]. 
All these unique features of VoIP applications have significant security implications 
which make VoIP more challenging to secure. 
1.3 Thesis Approach 
Our approach takes advantage of a combination of technologies to enhance the efficiency 
of intrusion detection in VoIP environments. It starts with developing host-based specifications 
for the protocols involved in SIP-based IP telephony starting from application layer protocols 
such as Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), to transport 
and network layer protocols such as TCP, UDP, ICMP, and IP. The host-based architecture is 
encouraged by the current shift of interest in VoIP environments from the center to the edges of 
the network. The specifications are derived from the IETF Request For Comment documents 
(RFCs) which describe the protocols. The developed specifications form the basis of our 
specification-based detection modules. As can be seen from our earlier discussions, no intrusion 
detection approach stands alone to detect all computer penetrations. Each approach is technically 
suited to identify a subset of the security violations to which a computer is subject. Given the 
complementary nature of the strengths and weaknesses of signature-based and specification-
based intrusion detection, we combine both approaches in such a hybrid way that we realize the 
combination of their strengths and avoid the weaknesses of either one. 
Both specification-based and signature-based modules combine protocol-syntax and 
protocol-semantics anomaly detection techniques. Such a feature is vital in the detection process 
to cover all aspects of the protocols being monitored. It allows us to report any violations of the 
standards in the protocol packets, alongside reporting any deviation from the expected protocol 
behavior during a session. 
Our specification-based detection modules are developed in part based on the 
Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEFSMs) model which allows us to represent 
each of the involved protocols as an Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM). An EFSM is a 
suitable structure to model the control flow of the protocol and its data, and to spot any deviation 











a combination of stateful and cross-protocol intrusion detection. Stateful detection implies 
building up relevant state within a session and across sessions and using the state in matching for 
possible attacks. Cross-protocol detection allows the IDS to access packets from multiple 
protocols in a system to perform its detection. Both types of detection are important to keep the 
state of the session and to guard against anomalies of involved protocols. 
On the other hand, our signature-based detection modules are based in part on describing 
an attack at the session level as a sequence of actions that the attacker performs to compromise 
the security of a computer system. This sequence of actions is best modeled by state transition 
analysis techniques. State transition analysis techniques represent an attack as well-defined states 
and transitions between these states. This representation allows signatures to complement the 
EFSM-based module in the specification-based component and to overcome some of its 
shortcomings. It also allows the creation of semantics-aware signatures. 
As proof-of-concept of the proposed architecture, we implement an IDS prototype in a 
network simulator in addition to implementing a variety of attacks that target application, 
transport, and network layer protocols. The hit rate of the system is tested by launching these 
attacks against hosts equipped with our IDS prototype. The network simulator is also used to 
analyze the performance of the design quantitatively under various network conditions. 
1.4 Thesis Scope and Limitation 
Security threats in VoIP environments can be classified into three main categories: 
1. Network level threats: Threats to VoIP at the network level are propagated via the use of 
low-level protocols such as IP, ICMP, UDP, and TCP. In most network architectures and 
corresponding communications protocol stacks, network layer protocol data units are 
transmitted in the clear, meaning that they are not cryptographically protected during their 
transmission. Consequently, it is relatively simple to do malicious things, such as inspecting 
the contents of the data units, forging the source or destination addresses, modifying the 
contents, or even replying old data units. IP as a network layer protocol is no exception to 
this. IP has no built-in security features such as authentication and encryption unless 











The lack of built-in security for IP packets makes it relatively easy to launch attacks such as 
malformed packets, flooding, denial of service, and buffer overflow attacks, which can 
result in a full or partial service loss. 
2. Application and protocol specific threats: VoIP protocols at the application level can be 
classified according to their role during the session. Signaling protocols are responsible for 
call setup, tear down, and modification. Media transport protocols are involved in end-to-
end transport of voice and multimedia data. In addition to that, support protocols are used to 
enable services and features required for proper network operation. A major source of 
vulnerabilities in signaling protocols is that they transmit packet headers and payloads in 
clear text by default. Media transport protocols introduce several vulnerabilities due to the 
absence of authentication and encryption  [13]. Even support protocols transmit sensitive 
data such as session IDs in clear text by default. It is therefore easy for attackers to cause 
call termination and call flooding as well as to spoof caller ID or to exercise other attacks. 
3. Content related threats: These threats can be well-presented by Spam over Internet 
Telephony (SPIT), and malicious payloads containing worms and viruses. A SPIT threat 
sends unsolicited calls to legitimate users. The calls contain mostly pre-recorded messages 
that annoy people or congest a voice mail system to overflowing. Viruses and worms cause 
Denial of Service (DoS) conditions due to the network traffic they generate as they replicate 
and seek out other hosts to infect. The lack of proper authentication at the application level 
and the poor network-level security control on the internal IP network make it easy 
respectively to spoof e-mail senders and to propagate viruses and worms. 
This thesis is concerned with both network level threats and VoIP-applications and 
protocol specific threats. In today’s VoIP networks, two major application level signaling 
protocols dominate: SIP and H.323. Our research is confined to threats in SIP and its 
accompanying media transport protocol RTP. The threats covered by this thesis include: 
1. Message flow attacks which are used by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the flow of 
messages used by signaling and transport protocols. 











3. Flooding attacks which are used by attackers to deny legitimate users access to network 
resources. 
Our specifications for SIP and RTP are based on RFC 3261  [14] and RFC 1889  [15] 
respectively. 
The same techniques used to address threats at the application level are used at the 
network level to detect its attacks. For that purpose, we cover some of the threats posed by IP, 
ICMP, UDP, and TCP. Content related threats such as SPIT, worms, and viruses are beyond the 
scope of this research. 
This thesis is not concerned with flaws in particular implementations of the protocols. 
Rather, generic problems of the protocols themselves are discussed, and various requirements for 
intrusion detection systems are addressed. For the most, there is no discussion of vendor-specific 
protocols or protocol features.  
VoIP environments can include nodes from different heterogeneous access networks that 
include WLAN, WiMAX, and cellular networks among others. In addition, mobility can have its 
own security implications in converged environments. The implemented prototype and the 
simulation scenarios are however tested and conducted in LAN. Our implementations do not 
take into account mobility requirements, and so no performance evaluation of the intrusion 
detection system’s effectiveness is done in a mobile environment. However, theoretical analysis 
is presented based on some mobile related attacks. 
The proposed architecture is compared analytically to several similar existing systems. 
However, a comparison by implementing these existing systems is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 consists of two main parts. The first part provides the necessary background 











protocols. The second part of the chapter compares our design against several systems that tend 
to adopt similar approaches in intrusion detection. The comparison revolves around certain key 
features that are suitable for intrusion detection in VoIP environments. This second part clearly 
shows the advantages of our IDS compared to others. 
Chapter 3 discusses the formal model upon which the IDS is designed. It starts with 
discussing the features and advantages of State Transition Analysis Techniques which form the 
basis of our signature-based detection module. Next, the chapter looks at Finite State Machines, 
their mathematical model, implementation approaches, and unique characteristics that qualify 
them to model networking protocols. That discussion is meant to prepare the reader for the more 
advanced Extended Finite State Machines and the Communicating Extended Finite State 
Machines model which form the basis of our specification-based detection module. Chapter 3 
concludes with some of the limitations of the abovementioned approaches as a prelude to the 
discussion on our system design. 
Chapter 4 presents the architecture of the proposed IDS from an application layer point of 
view. It follows a systematic approach by first discussing the involved protocols, namely, SIP 
and RTP and their threat model. Next, the chapter sheds some light on the specification 
development and the design of the state machines and verifiers for each of the protocols 
involved. The chapter then demonstrates the components of the proposed architecture and the 
role played by each component in the detection process. A discussion on the advantages of the 
proposed architecture follows. Finally, the chapter presents several implemented attacks, and 
shows how they can be detected by the various components of the system. 
Chapter 5 follows the footsteps of its predecessor discussing the extensions added to the 
proposed architecture to accommodate lower layer protocols. The same systematic approach is 
followed by first discussing the lower layer protocols involved, namely, IP, ICMP, UDP, and 
TCP and their threat model. Next, the chapter looks at the specification development and the 
design of the state machines and verifiers for each of the protocols involved. The chapter then 
demonstrates the extended architecture alongside its added benefits to the overall design. Finally, 
the chapter presents several implemented attacks and shows how they can be detected by various 











Chapter 6 is dedicated to implementation and simulation issues. It starts with mentioning 
some of the intrusion detection implementation approaches alongside the hurdles that face the 
implementation and testing of intrusion detection system. Then the chapter discusses the 
simulation tool used to implement our architecture, its support for the networking protocols at 
different layers, and how it overcomes implementation and testing hurdles. Next, the chapter 
sheds some light on the simulator features that are used to implement the attacks and the 
detection methodologies. A description of the simulated network topology and its configuration 
is presented, followed by the different traffic generation scenarios used to test the system. 
Chapter 7 presents and analyzes the produced results. The chapter consists of two main 
parts. The first part discusses the issues relating to detection accuracy. Several axes are covered 
in this part such as the IDS coverage, hit rate, and probability of false alarms. The effect of the 
implemented IDS on the performance of hosts is demonstrated in the second part of the chapter. 
The performance of the system is demonstrated in terms of end-to-end delay, call setup delay, 
processing delay, packet loss, and memory usage. The chapter concludes by drawing attention to 
some of the optimization techniques used to improve the performance. 
Chapter 8 presents a set of conclusions derived from the results and theoretical analysis 
done in the previous chapters. A summary of the concluding remarks on the various issues 
encountered in the previous chapters are illustrated. Further, this chapter gives some 
recommendations to improve the system and the evaluation methodology. Areas of research 











Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we shed some light on the different types of intrusion detection 
systems with regard to detection techniques and monitored resources. A major part of the 
previous chapter was dedicated to discussing the special security needs of converged networks 
and applications. The aim of that discussion was to highlight the importance of adopting new 
methods and combining existing ones in intrusion detection for more efficiency and accuracy. 
We demonstrated our approach in the first chapter by bringing to light the techniques 
adopted for better intrusion detection in VoIP environments. These techniques include a hybrid 
detection mechanism that combines specification-based and signature-based approaches. Our 
architecture also provides a cross-protocol detection mechanism in our specification-based and 
signature-based modules to exchange detection information across protocols to help the IDS 
make more accurate decisions. Although specification-based detection is very powerful by itself, 
it is limited to examining a single request or response  [16]. Many attacks involve multiple 
requests and responses and can not be detected by looking at individual requests and responses. 
Therefore, stateful detection forms an mportant technique in our approach. Another technique 
adopted by our approach is the ability to create session-level and semantics-based signatures to 
cope with the rising complexity of VoIP attacks. 
Since this research focuses on intrusion detection in VoIP environments, we start this 
chapter by introducing some basic concepts about VoIP systems and architecture. Several similar 
IDSs have been proposed and implemented. The chapter will also provide a discussion on these 
systems and how they relate to our proposed architecture. The discussion will revolve around the 
techniques we mentioned in the previous paragraph. The chapter will also shed some light on 
IDSs designed for VoIP and how they are compared to our design. 
2.2 VoIP Architecture  











sending data, a point-to-point static channel is allocated in the circuit-switched network. Such a 
channel is dedicated entirely to the voice call and not shared with others which assures a certain 
level of quality. IP protocol forms the decisive difference between circuit-switched networks and 
VoIP networks. It is being used to carry voice alongside data. IP networks which are packet-
switched break voice and data into packets that are routed to a certain destination. Upon arrival 
at the destination, the packets are reassembled into their original format. Contrary to circuit-
switched networks, packets in packet-switched networks can travel across multiple independent 
paths to the final destination. This feature can benefit the network in terms of self-recovery with 
failed link paths because paths can be allocated dynamically. These differences between 
traditional circuit-switched and VoIP networks entail changes in the infrastructure and protocols 
used. 
2.2.1 VoIP Infrastructure 
Components in VoIP infrastructure can be generally classified into servers, endpoints, 
and routing nodes. VoIP servers are the components responsible for various duties aiming at 
maintaining the service and enhancing it. For example, Address resolution servers are 
responsible for providing address translation and access control to VoIP terminals and gateways. 
Registration servers provide better mobility support by registering users and routing their traffic 
regardless of their geographical location. Furthermore, redirect servers can inform callers if the 
information of the callee they are trying to reach has changed. The abovementioned examples of 
servers are not meant to be comprehensive, but rather to give an overview on the various 
functions performed by servers in VoIP environments. 
Endpoints are the devices capable of initiating and terminating a call. They can take the 
form of IP softphones which can look and feel like traditional phones but have more 
functionality and intelligence. Other forms of endpoints are instant messaging clients and video 
clients. 
Routing nodes in VoIP environments have the capacity to connect IP networks to either 
other IP networks or circuit-switched networks. When connecting two or more IP networks, IP 











them to their recipients. When circuit-switched networks are involved, routing nodes act as 
gateways to translate between incompatible interfaces and protocols. 
Figure 2-1 shows an example of VoIP infrastructure.  
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Figure  2-1. V IP infrastructure 
2.2.2 VoIP Protocols 
In this subsection, we shed some light on the most dominant multimedia suites, namely, 
H.323 and SIP. Both protocols are used for signaling and with them come other protocols that 
cater for functions other than signaling in VoIP environments. 
H.323 was originally designed based on ITU-T Signaling System Number 7  [17] (also 
known as SS7) which defines how devices in the PSTN network exchange data. This feature 
gives H.323 advantage when it comes to internetworking efficiency with PSTN networks. H.323 
specifications  [18] define many sub-protocols that address different aspects of a session. For 
instance, H.225 is a sub-protocol that is responsible for call setup and tear-down. H.245 is 
another sub-protocol that is responsible for call control. H.323 specifies other protocols for data 












On the other hand, SIP is much simpler than H.323, but with less internetworking 
capabilities with PSTN systems. It was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
in RFC 2543  [19] which was later updated by RFC 3261  [14]. SIP was designed to address some 
important issues in setting up and tearing down sessions such as user location, user availability, 
and session management. The versatility of SIP makes it the choice of instant messaging, video 
conferencing, and multiplayer game applications among others. 
2.3 Cross-Layer and Cross-Protocol Intrusion Detection 
Cross-layer and cross-protocol intrusion detection are very relevant to VoIP 
environments. Services at the application layer in a converged environment could easily span 
across multiple protocols and specifications. A typical VoIP session involves the Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) for call management and the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) for 
data delivery along with the rest of protocols at lower layers. Each of the protocols involved has 
its own set of vulnerabilities, and several attacks are based on sequences that cross protocol 
boundaries. 
The concept of integrating multiple layers of the protocol stack for efficient intrusion 
detection was introduced by Zhang and Lee  [20]. They developed a cross-layer based IDS 
architecture to study the abnormalities in the network using anomaly detection. Another 
remarkable attempt was made by G. Thamilarasu et al  [21] in the CIDS intrusion detection 
architecture. However, both architectures are based on anomaly-based detection techniques in 
wireless networks rather than Specification-based techniques which are more reliable as 
mentioned earlier. In addition, CIDS system is confined to a certain type of Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks. 
The WebSTAT system  [22] provides intrusion detection for web servers. It works by 
correlating both network-level and operating system-level events with entries contained in server 
logs. However, no correlation is performed within concurrently executing protocols at the same 
layer. 
Our architecture provides cross-protocol detection at the application layer to cover the 











the cross-protocol capabilities. The architecture also provides cross-layer detection techniques to 
allow different layers to exchange detection information efficiently. 
2.4 Stateful Intrusion Detection 
Stateful detection involves performing analysis for an entire connection or session, 
capturing and storing certain pieces of relevant data seen in the session, and using these data to 
identify attacks that involve multiple requests and responses  [8]. State transition analysis and 
state machines are some of the techniques used by IDSs to perform stateful detection. 
The state transition analysis technique was conceived as a method to describe computer 
penetrations as a sequence of actions that an attacker performs to compromise the security of a 
computer system. Attacks are graphically described by using state transition diagrams. States 
represent snapshots of system’s volatile, semi-permanent, and permanent memory locations. A 
description of an attack has a “safe” starting state and at least one “compromised” ending state. 
States are characterized by means of assertions which are predicates on some aspects of the 
security state of the system. Transitions between states are indicated by signature actions that 
represent the actions that if omitted from the execution of an attack scenario, would prevent the 
attack from completing successfully  [23]. 
State transition analysis technique was adopted by STAT system  [24] which targeted 
hosts. NetSTAT  [23] used the same techniques targeting networks. NetSTAT takes advantage of 
peculiar characteristics of intrusion detection based on analysis of network traffic. Networks 
provide detailed information about computer system activity and can provide this information 
regardless of the installed operating systems or the auditing modules available on the host. 
However, both STAT and NetSTAT are considered signature-based systems. Being only 
signature-based limited the ability of these systems to detect new attacks. On the other hand, J. 
M. Orset, B. Alcalde, and A. Cavalli  [25] proposed Extended Finite State Machine-based IDS 
that used specifications of routing protocol OLSR to detect anomalies in Ad Hoc networks. 
However, their solution was not complemented by a signature-based component, which made it 
difficult to detect attacks such as DoS attacks. C. C. Michael and A. Ghosh  [89] proposed 











machine and the other monitor statistical deviations from normal program behavior. The absence 
of a solid specification based approach in their algorithms leaves a chance to a relatively high 
false alarm rate. 
Our design uses an advanced form of state transition analysis and state machines in its 
signature-based and specification-based detection modules respectively to provide stateful 
detection. 
2.5 Signature-based Intrusion Detection 
One of the most popular signature-based intrusion detection systems is Snort  [26]. Snort 
targets networks and performs real-time analysis of packets and triggers alarms when certain 
conditions are met. The Snort database design defines the lowest level of detail as an event, 
which is the combination of a collection of packet header and data and an active Snort rule called 
a signature. However, Snort’s approach falls short of providing a basis for semantics-aware 
signatures at the session level. Sommer and Paxon  [27] proposed adding connection-level 
context to signatures to reduce false positives in signature-based detection. However, their aim 
was to complement the most common form of signature matching, which is low-level string 
matching, with context. In  [86] and  [87], M. Zulkernine, M. Graves, U. Khan, and M. Raihan 
proposed integrating two languages for software specification and security specification to 
reduce duplication of efforts and conflicting requirements. In [87] specifically, M. Zulkernine, 
M. Graves, and U. Khan used this technique to automatically translate attack scenarios written in 
these two languages into Snort rules. However, all these efforts were confined to adding context 
information to Snort signatures. 
Our signature database combines both types of signatures, byte-level and semantics-
aware. Our semantics-awareness is based on the state transition analysis technique that is used to 
describe the semantics of attacks and penetrations. The state transition analysis technique can 
model attacks at the session level rather than lower and semantics less levels. The lowest level of 
detail in our semantics-based module is the state instead of the traditional event. This feature 
enables our database to store a higher-level abstraction of attacks than previous works and 











2.6 Hybrid Intrusion Detection 
Hybrid IDSs can trace their origins back to systems such as IDES  [28], NADIR  [29], and 
W&S  [30]. IDES provides an anomaly-based component that identifies expected behavior at the 
user, group, remote host, and target system level. The IDES anomaly component in combination 
with the IDES penetration identifier rule-base provides a way of learning and representing 
normal behavior, as well as a way of representing improper behavior. NADIR’s implementation 
is similar to IDES in that it employs statistical anomaly component in conjunction with a small 
rule-base of expert penetration rules. NADIR’s expert rule-base consists of penetration rules that 
are developed by interviewing and working with security personnel. In W&S, the penetration 
detection component is combined into the same rule-base to represent site-specific policies, 
expert penetration rules, and other administrative data. However, it was difficult in all these 
systems to establish proper behavior patterns, resulting in a relatively large number of false 
alarms. Using system specifications as the detection baseline in our architecture reduces the false 
alarm rate significantly. 
Sekar et al  [6] proposed a hybrid intrusion detection system that combined specification-
based and anomaly-based detection. Their reliance on protocol specifications helped to simplify 
the process of feature selection which plays a major role in anomaly detection approaches. 
However, their reliance on anomaly-based detection hindered the system ability to detect attacks 
that were not based on repetition. Such attacks can be detected by our architecture. In  [88], P. 
Uppuluri and R. Sekar proposed a detection system that combines specification-based and 
signature-based approaches. Although their proposed system showed a high detection rate, its 
signature-based component only stored simple and less sophisticated attacks.   
2.7 Intrusion Detection Systems for VoIP Environments 
Our discussion in the previous sections aimed at highlighting the features that should be 
adopted by intrusion detection systems in VoIP environments. We discussed the techniques used 
by some related systems to enable such features and we mentioned the advantages of our design 
over these systems. We believe it is in order to bring to light some of the intrusion detection 











intrusion detection systems either succeed or fail to adopt the aforementioned features, and how 
our architecture is compared to them. 
The special needs of converged networks and applications, and the prevalence of VoIP 
telephony resulted in the introduction of SCIDIVE  [13] intrusion detection system. SCIDIVE is 
a stateful and cross-protocol intrusion detection system for VoIP environments. SCIDIVE can be 
considered a signature-based detection system rather than an anomaly-based system. It works by 
accessing packets from multiple protocols in a system and comparing them against well-created 
cross-protocol rules. As mentioned previously, signature-based systems lack the ability to detect 
new and novel attacks, and the rule database needs to be updated on a regular basis following 
new attacks. These drawbacks are addressed by vIDS  [31]. Instead of relying entirely on a rule 
database, vIDS is based on interacting protocol state machines. However, all the attacks used to 
test the efficiency of vIDS were known attacks and had to be encoded in the system as attack 
patterns. The capabilities of vIDS in detecting attacks based on normal behavior specifications 
were not shown. Moreover, the design of vIDS covers the issues relating to protocol-semantics 
anomaly detection, while not addressing protocol-syntax anomaly detection. We mentioned in 
Section 1.1.1.3 the importance of supporting both protocol-semantics and protocol-syntax 
anomaly detection. Both SCIDIVE and vIDS are dedicated only for VoIP application layer 
protocols and not addressing threats at lower layers using the same techniques. 
Another attempt to address the special needs of VoIP environments has been made by 
vFDS  [32]. vFDS is an online statistical detection mechanism. Its detection goes beyond 
detecting attacks at the application layer, to detect transport layer attacks as well. However, the 
reliance of vFDS on pure statistical anomaly approaches affects its sensitivity negatively. In 
addition, vFDS is limited to detecting flooding attacks. 
Our design provides a combination of specification-based and signature-based detection 
techniques to bring the false alarm rate to its lowest level. It also addresses protocol-syntax and 
protocol-semantics-related issues to cover a wider range of attacks, in addition to addressing 











Table 2-1. Comparison against other IDSs for VoIP environments 

























Yes No Yes Yes 
















Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Table 2-1 summarizes the differences between our proposed architecture and other 
intrusion detection systems that are designed for VoIP environments. Every column in the table 
represents a desirable feature that should be supported by the detection system. Rows represent 
different proposed systems including ours. 
2.8 Chapter Discussion 
This chapter aimed at highlighting the unique features possessed by VoIP environments 











VoIP environments revolved around their architecture, infrastructure, and protocols. Based on 
that discussion the chapter suggested some detection features that should be present in intrusion 
detection systems for VoIP environments. Those desired features were: cross-protocol 
awareness, stateful detection, and a combination of signature-based and specification-based 
techniques with semantics-awareness. Some of the systems that adopt the aforementioned 
features were mentioned, and how our proposed design differed was discussed. The chapter then 
dedicated the last section to present whether some VoIP intrusion detection systems were in line 
with these features or not and how our design excelled over them. The next chapter will discuss 












Chapter 3 State Transition Analysis and State Machines: 
Applications in Intrusion Detection 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced basic concepts on VoIP architecture, infrastructure, and 
protocols. Furthermore, features that are deemed necessary for intrusion detection in VoIP 
environments were discussed. That discussion followed a systematic approach by showing how 
comparable systems succeeded or failed to adopt those features, and how our approach applied 
the same features in its detection techniques. The previous chapter then concluded by comparing 
intrusion detection systems designed for VoIP environments to our proposed architecture. That 
comparison demonstrated the advantages of our architecture over other architectures.  
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation of our proposed architecture by discussing 
State Transition Analysis and State Machines which are used in our signature-based and 
specification-based modules. The use and application of these methods in intrusion detection 
will be discussed as well. 
3.2 State Transition Analysis 
State Transition Analysis was developed by the Reliable Software Group at University of 
California, Santa Barbara to represent computer penetrations. State transition analysis forms a 
method for representing the sequence of actions that the attacker performs to achieve a security 
violation. In State Transition Analysis, a penetration is viewed as a sequence of actions 
performed by an attacker which leads from some initial state on a system to a target 
compromised state, where a state is a snapshot of the system representing the values of all 
volatile, semi-permanent and permanent memory locations on the system. The initial state 
corresponds to the state of the system just prior to the execution of the penetration, and the 
compromised state corresponds to the state of the system resulting from the completion of the 
penetration. Between the initial and compromised states are one or more intermediate state 











A state transition diagram is the graphical representation that the state transition analysis 
uses to represent a penetration. This representation is useful for describing attacks in that it 
provides an interesting level of abstraction to the analyst: just above the system call and below 
English description  [24]. This level of abstraction allows for higher-level, semantics-aware 
representation of the attack scenario. A state diagram can take the form of a directed graph 
which consists of: labeled circles to represent system states, input symbols to represent the input 
at each state, output symbols to represent the output from each state, edges to represent 
transitions between states, a start state, and a final state. 
It was noticed by the development team that if the state changes of a computer system 
could be monitored, then state transition analysis could be developed from a method for 
representing computer penetrations to a method for detecting penetrations as well. A mechanism 
to record system state changes already existed in the form of audit facilities. Audit facilities 
record the state changes made by users on monitored system attributes. The information kept in 
the system’s audit trail can be analyzed by appropriate tools and compared to state transition 
diagrams of known penetrations.  
A major problem with signature-based detection systems other than state transition 
analysis-based ones is their entire dependence on audit record fields. Such systems pattern match 
their signatures to audit records, which lets some penetrations go unnoticed if they manage to 
make a slight change in their scenario. One solution to this problem is to use a higher-level 
representation for signatures which is what state transition analysis does. The attack 
representation used by state transition analysis is audit record independent and can accommodate 
slight variations by the same penetration. In addition, other signature-based systems have no 
ability to foresee an impending compromise and preempt or limit the damage before it occurs. 
State transition analysis can anticipate an impending compromise at the state prior to the 
compromised one and forewarn administrators accordingly. Figure 3-1 sheds more light on this 
important feature that is missed in other signature-based intrusion detection techniques. The 
figure shows a state transition diagram of a certain attack. To successfully execute the attack, the 
attacker needs to reach the system state State0, have Assertion 1 and Assertion 2 hold, and 
perform a sequence of actions represented by State1 and State2. If the system reaches State0 and 











warning about the potential impending Compromised State. The intermediate states State1 and 











Figure 3-1. State Transition Diagram of an Attack 
State transition diagrams form the common factor between State Transition Analysis and 
State Machines which will be discussed in the next section. 
3.3 Finite State Machines 
A Finite State Machine (FSM) is a model of behavior that consists of a set of input events 
(actions), a set of output events (actions), a set of states, and a set of transitions  [33].  
3.3.1 Finite State Machine Representation 
Finite State Machines can be represented using several types of state transition tables. 
One of the most common is shown in table 3-1. 
A combination of Current State and Input produces Output and makes the machine move 
to Next State. Input and Output are regarded as two finite and disjoint sets of signals, namely, 











transition rule is executed by the machine and a change occurs to the value of the output signals. 
A state transition table can be easily transformed into a state transition diagram as shown in 
figure 3-2. 
Table 3-1. State Transition Table 
Current State Input Output Next State 
State0 Input0 Output0 State1 
State1 Input1 Output1 State2 










Figure 3-2. State Transition Diagram for Table 3-1 
Finite State Machines are used widely to model systems in many different areas such as 
circuit design, linguistics, and logic. Communication protocols are good candidates to be 
represented by finite state machines. A protocol is often most easily understood as a state 











protocol states and state transitions. In a way, the protocol state symbolizes the assumptions that 
each process in the system makes about the others. It defines what actions a process is allowed to 
take, which events it expects to happen, and how it will respond to those events  [34]. 
3.3.2 Mathematical Model and Definitions 
Finite State Machines (FSMs) can usually be modeled by Mealy machines that produce 
outputs on their state transitions after receiving inputs. 
Definition 3.1. A finite state machine (FSM) M is a quintuple 
M = (I, O, S, δ, λ) 
where I, O, and S are finite and nonempty sets of input symbols, utput symbols, and states, 
respectively. 
δ: S X I  S is the state transition function; 
λ: S X I  O is the output function. 
When the machine is in a current state s in S and receives an input a from I, it moves to the next 
state specified by δ(s, a) and produces an output given by λ(s, a). 
A Mealy machine has a finite number of states and produces outputs on state transitions 
after receiving inputs. Another popular type of finite state machines is Moore machines. The 
theory is very similar for the two types. Mealy machines, which are mainly considered here, 
model finite state systems more properly and are more general than Moore machines. 
The finite state machine in the aforementioned definition is fully specified in a sense that 
at a state and upon an input there is a specified next state by the state transition function and a 
specified output by the output function. Otherwise, the machine is partially specified; at certain 
states with some inputs, the next states or outputs are not specified. Also the machine defined is 
deterministic; at a state and upon an input, the machine follows a unique transition to a next 
state. Otherwise, the machine is non-deterministic; the machine may follow more than one 











deterministic state machines in its implementation. 
3.3.3 Implementation of Finite State Machines 
The way finite state machines are implemented for a system affects the performance of 
that system greatly. Like all software, finite state machines are subject to change and 
maintenance. Implementers of FSMs should plan foremost whether it would be easy with their 
implementation methodology to add, remove, or change a state, event, or transition during 
maintenance. More than one instance of a finite state machine is often needed to be kept in the 
memory of a system. Implementers of finite state machines should bear in mind how the scheme 
they are using is adding to the cost of instance creation and if they can prevent unnecessary 
duplication of objects. 
Mainly, two methods are widely used to implement finite state machines, namely, the 
procedural approach and the object oriented approach. In procedural languages, FSMs can be 
implemented efficiently using a double case statement. The outer case statement selects on the 
current State of the FSM. Then the inner case statement selects the appropriate behavior for the 
current State given the type of event that was sent to the FSM. A major disadvantage of using 
this approach is when the structure of the FSM needs some change due to a change in the 
specifications. A lot of code has to be modified even for very simple changes in the 
specifications. However, the procedural approach is very efficient regarding instance creation 
and memory management. 
By using object orientation, the use of case statements can be avoided through the use of 
dynamic binding. Each case becomes a State class and the correct case is selected by looking at 
the current state-object. This approach makes understanding of the implementation much easier 
than the procedural approach. However, code for a transition can be scattered vertically in the 
class hierarchy. Furthermore, this approach could be very inefficient with regard to the cost of 
objects creation and memory management. Other approaches have been introduced to overcome 












3.4 Extended Finite State Machines 
In principle, finite state machines model appropriately the control portions of 
communication protocols. However, in practice the usual specifications of protocols include 
variables and operations based on variable values; ordinary FSMs are not powerful enough to 
model in a succinct way the physical systems any more. To accommodate these needs of 
protocols and other complicated systems, Extended Finite State Machines (EFSMs) were 
introduced. 
The model of a Mealy Finite State Machine (FSM) extended with input and output 
parameters, context variables, operations, and predicates defined over context variables and input 
parameters is what is understood by an Extended FSM (EFSM). The FSM underlying an EFSM 
is often said to model the control flow of a system, while parameters, variables, predicates, and 
operations reflect its data flow (or context). 
3.4.1 Mathematical Model and Definitions 
To define a general type of EFSMs, we use finite disjoint sets for signal parameters and 
context variables, denoted, respectively, R and V, as follows: Input or output signals of FSM are 
associated with a subset of parameters, so that the signal and a valuation of parameters from the 
set R associated with the signal constitute a parameterized signal, input or output. A state and a 
valuation of the context variables in the set V constitute a so-called configuration of the EFSM. 
Input and output parameters do not contribute to the configuration space. Thus, if one flattens an 
EFSM into a normal FSM (assuming finite domains for all parameters and variables), 
parameterized signals of the EFSM become inputs and outputs of the FSM, while configurations 
of the EFSM constitute the states. Signal parameters and context variables of an EFSM are all 
parameters of various objects in the EFSM. The difference is that all the context variables 
parameterize states, while only subsets of parameters are used to define input or output (this is 
why we call them differently). Signal parameters and context variables could share common 
types (i.e., have the same value) and sometimes they are all just called variables associated with 











In the following definitions, let X and Y be finite sets of inputs and outputs, R and V be 
finite disjoint sets of parameter and variable names. For x  X, we note Rx ⊆ R the set of input 
parameters and DRx the set of valuations of parameters in the set Rx. For y  Y, we define 
similarly Ry and DRy . Finally, DV is a set of context variable valuations v. 
Definition 3.2. An extended finite state machine (EFSM) M over X, Y , R, V , and the associated 
valuation domains is a pair (S, T) of a finite set of states S and a finite set of transitions T 
between states in S, such that each transition t  T is a tuple (s, x, P, op, y, up, s’), where 
• s, s’  S are the initial and final states of the transition, respectively; 
• x   X is the input of the transition; 
• y   Y is the output of the transition; 
• P, op, and up are functions, defined over input parameters and context variables V , 
namely, 
o P: DRx X DV  {True, False} is the predicate of the transition. 
o op: DRx X DV  DRy is the output parameter function of the transition. 
o up: DRx X DV  DV is the context update function of the transition. 
Definition 3.3. Given input x and a (possibly empty) set of input parameter valuations DRx, a 
parameterized input is a tuple (x, px), where px  DRx. A sequence of parameterized inputs is 
called a parameterized input sequence. 
   Similarly, we define parameterized outputs and their sequences. 
Definition 3.4. A context variable valuation v  DV is called a context of M. A configuration of 
M is a tuple (s, v) of state s and context v. 












Definition 3.5. A transition is said to be enabled for a configuration and parameterized input if 
the transition predicate evaluates to True. 
The EFSM operates as follows: The machine receives input along with input parameters 
(if any) and computes the predicates that are satisfied for the current configuration. The 
predicates identify enabled transitions. A single transition among those enabled fires. Executing 
the chosen transition, the machine produces output along with output parameters, which, if they 
exist, are computed from the current context and input parameters by the use of the output 
parameter function. The machine updates the current context according to the context update 
function and moves from the initial to the final state of the transition. Transitions are atomic and 
cannot be interrupted. The machine usually starts from a designated configuration, called the 
initial configuration. A pair of an EFSM M and an initial configuration is called a strongly 
initialized EFSM  [38]. 
We can build elaborate systems of interacting machines by connecting the output signals 
of one machine to the input signals of another to form Communicating Extended Finite State 
Machines (CEFSMs)  [34]. 
3.4.2 EFSMs in Specification-based Intrusion Detection 
Internet protocols can be ea ily modeled as EFSMs. A protocol can be viewed as a 
sequence of processes (states) chained by a set of events (transitions). A running protocol EFSM 
receives packets (input signals) through one of the available ports. Packets usually contain 
header fields with values (input parameters). Upon receiving a packet, a check is performed to 
identify the packet type (predicate) and to determine the appropriate event (transition). Some 
transitions represent unexpected packets, which usually occur due to network failures or an 
attack. Similarly, absence of expected packets, and the consequent transition on a timeout event, 
suggests a failure or an attack. Another source of input to a protocol state machine could be a 
signal sent by another protocol state machine (synchronization signals). 
The execution of the chosen event (transition) could result in producing and sending a 
packet with its header values (parameterized output signal) by a dedicated function (output 











defined set of instructions (context update function). 
Figure 3-3 shows a state transition diagram for a protocol that has three states and two 
transitions based on its specifications. When the state machine is in state 1, and upon receiving 
input signal (inp1), a predicate is computed to choose the appropriate transition which leads to 
state 2. The dotted transition, which leads to the attack state, represents an unexpected input 
received at state 1. The unexpected input results in the predicate failing to enable a legitimate 








Figure 3-3. A state transition diagram that shows normal and potential abnormal protocol behavior. 
3.4.3 Limitations of EFSM model in Specification-based Detection 
Despite the remarkable convenience State Transition Diagrams (STDs) provide for the 
EFSM model in specification-based IDSs, there are also problems with state machines approach 
in this type of detection: 
• It can model abnormal behavior as a simple and straightforward sequence of events rather 
than more complex forms. This limitation will become clear when we discuss some of the 












• Some attacks, which are launched by abusing legitimate features of the system, can pass 
EFSM-based anomaly detection without being detected. This limitation is the reason why 
STD-based EFSMs cannot directly detect attacks such as Denial of Service and failed 
logins in anomaly mode  [39]. 
Clearly, a signature-based approach that is based on a flexible and more advanced state 
transition analysis is needed to assist EFSM-based specification detection approaches to detect 
such attacks. The suggestion of an accompanying signature detection mechanism based on state 
transition analysis is a natural product of the remarkable similarities between EFSM-based and 
state transition analysis-based approaches. 
3.5 Chapter Discussion 
This chapter presented the theoretical foundation of our detection methodologies. It 
started by discussing state transition analysis techniques and how they were used to model and 
detect computer penetrations. The chapter highlighted the advantages of state transition analysis 
over other approaches and why it was preferred for signature-based intrusion detection. 
Furthermore, finite state machines, their representation, mathematical model, and 
implementation issues were discussed in detail. The chapter mentioned the shortcomings of finite 
state machines in protocol modeling as a prelude to discussing extended finite state machines. 
The mathematical model of extended finite state machines and their use in specification-based 
intrusion detection were detailed. The chapter concluded the discussion on extended finite state 
machines by shedding some light on their limitations. That conclusion suggested the importance 
of combining state transition analysis as a signature-based detection mechanism with extended 
finite state machines as specification-based one to form a hybrid detection methodology. The 
next chapter will show how we adopt the principles demonstrated in this chapter and translate 











Chapter 4 System Design: An Application Layer 
Perspective 
4.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the theoretical background of the proposed architecture. 
State Transition Analysis techniques which form a basis in our signature-based detection 
modules were discussed. Furthermore, Extended Finite State Machines which constitute a 
foundation in our specification-based modules were thrashed out. The conclusion of the previous 
chapter was to draw the attention to the convenience of combining both methods in intrusion 
detection based on the remarkable similarities between them. 
This chapter kicks off the discussion on the design of the proposed architecture. The 
chapter will focus on the application layer protocols and their threat model. It will then show 
how the proposed architecture adopts the methods mentioned in the previous chapter to build a 
concrete IDS. The components of the architecture and their functionality will be demonstrated. 
The attacks implemented to test the credibility of the design and the related issues will also be 
discussed. 
4.2  Related Protocols and Threat Model 
As mentioned in the first chapter, we consider SIP suite for our discussion on the related 
protocols. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a standard signaling protocol for VoIP, and is 
appropriately coined as the “SS7 of future telephony.” It was developed by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 2543 which was updated by RFC 3261. SIP was 
designed to address some important issues in setting up and tearing down sessions such as user 
location, user availability, and session management. The simplicity and versatility of SIP make it 
the choice of instant messaging, video conferencing, and multiplayer game applications among 
others. SIP uses other protocols to perform various functions during a session such as Session 
Description Protocol (SDP) to describe the characteristics of end devices, Resource Reservation 












In this section we concentrate on SIP and RTP for the vital role they play in the 
establishing, tearing down, and carrying the data of the session. 
4.2.1 SIP Message Format 
The SIP message is made up of three parts: the start line, message headers, and body. The 
start line contents vary depending on whether the SIP message is a request or a response. For 
requests it is referred to as a request line and for responses it is referred to as a status line. Figure 
4-1 shows SIP message format. 
 
Figure 4-1. SIP Message Format. 
The base SIP specifications define six types of request: the INVITE request, CANCEL 
request, ACK request and BYE request are used for session creation, modification, 
establishment, and termination; the REGISTER request is used to register a certain user's contact 

















   Response types or codes are also classified into six classes. 1xx for 
provisional/informational responses, 2xx for success responses, 3xx for redirection responses, 
4xx for client error responses, 5xx for server error responses, and 6xx for global failure responses. 
The "xx" are two digits that indicate the exact nature of the response: for example, a "180" 
provisional response indicates ringing by the remote end, while a "181" provisional response 
indicates that a call is being forwarded.  
   Header fields contain information related to the request like the initiator of the request, 
the recipient, and call identification. Some headers are mandatory in every SIP request and 
response. These are: To (carries the recipient of the request), From (carries the initiator of the 
request), Call ID (carries the unique identifier of the call), CSeq (used to identify the order of 
transactions), Via (contains the transport protocol and the address where the response is to be 
sent), Max-Forwards (used to limit the number of hops a request traverses and to avoid loops), 
and Contact (contains the address of the host where the request originated). 
Message bodies can carry any text-based information whose interpretation is determined 
by request and response codes. 
4.2.2 SIP Architecture 
Elements in SIP can be classified into user agents (UAs) and intermediaries (servers). In 
an ideal world, communications between two endpoints (or UAs) happen without the need for 
servers. However, this is not always the case as network administrators and service providers 
would like to keep track of traffic in their network. 
   A SIP UA or terminal is the endpoint of dialogs: it sends and receives SIP requests and 
responses, it is the endpoint of multimedia streams, and it is usually the user equipment (UE) 
which is an application in a terminal or a dedicated hardware appliance. 
   SIP servers are logical entities where SIP messages pass through on their way to their 
final destination. These servers are used to route and redirect requests. These servers include: 











• Redirect server—maps the address of requests into new addresses. 
• Location server—keeps track of the location of users. 
• Registrar—a server that accepts REGISTER requests. 
• Application server—an Application Server (AS) is an entity in the network that provides 
end users with a service. 
4.2.3 SIP Session 



















Figure 4-2. Establishment of a typical SIP Session 
When turning on their devices, both users register their availability and their IP addresses 
with the SIP proxy server using REGISTER request. The proxy server then sends this 
information to the relevant Registrar server. The caller tells the proxy server that he/she wants to 
contact a certain callee using INVITE request. The SIP proxy server relays the caller’s invitation 
to the callee. The callee informs the proxy server that the caller’s invitation is acceptable with 
OK response. The SIP proxy server communicates this response to the caller who sends ACK 











them to interact. Any of the parties involved in a session can end it by sending a BYE request. 
4.2.4 RTP Message Format 
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is an application layer protocol that provides end-to-
end delivery services for real-time audio and video. It was developed by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) in RFC 1889 which was updated by RFC 3550. Figure 4-3 shows RTP 
message format.   
 
Figure 4-3. RTP Message Format. 
The message fields are: Version (contains the version of RTP), Padding (indicates 
whether the message contains padding octets or not, and may be needed by some encryption 
algorithms), Extension (indicates if there is an RTP header extension), Contributing Source 
Count (contains the number of contributing source (CSRC) IDs that follow the fixed header), 
Marker (interpreted by an application profile), Payload Type (identifies the payload format), 
Sequence Number (increments by one with each packet and is used by the receiver to reorder the 
packets), Timestamp (indicates the time when the first octet in the payload was sampled), 
Synchronization Source Identifier (identifies the source of RTP packets), and Contributing 
Source Identifier (if a mixer has been used, this field carries a list of sources that have 
contributed to the mixed media stream).  







Synchronization Source (SSRC) identifier 











4.2.5 SIP Threat Model 
In this subsection and the following one (4.2.6), we shed some light on the threats that 
surround SIP and RTP. The aim is to prepare the reader for the more detailed discussion on 
attacks in Section 4.6. SIP is susceptible to the following threats and attacks: 
• Denial of service: The consequence of a DoS attack is that the entity attacked becomes 
unavailable. DoS attacks include scenarios like targeting a certain UA or proxy and 
flooding them with requests. 
• Eavesdropping: If messages are sent in clear text, any malicious user can eavesdrop and 
get session information, making it easy for attackers to launch a variety of hijacking-style 
attacks. 
• Tearing down sessions: An attacker can insert messages like a CANCEL request to stop a 
caller from communicating with someone else. It can also send a BYE request to terminate 
the session. 
• Session hijacking: An attacker can send an INVITE request within dialog requests to 
modify requests en route to change session descriptions and direct media elsewhere. 
• Man in the middle: This attack is where attackers tamper with a message on its way to a 
recipient  [40]. 
4.2.6 RTP Threat Model 
Attackers can inject artificial packets with higher sequence numbers that will cause the 
injected packets to be played in place of the real ones  [13]. Flooding with RTP packets not only 
deteriorates the perceived quality of service (QoS) but also may cause phones dysfunctional and 
reboot operations  [31]. 
4.3 Specification Development 











and 1889 respectively. Request for Comment (RFC) documents provide designers and 
programmers with rich information regarding the operation and message flow of a certain 
protocol. However, RFC documents usually contain very detailed descriptions that could be 
time-consuming if implemented precisely. Furthermore, precise implementation of RFCs may be 
undesirable due to the inevitable discrepancies among different implementations of a protocol 
EFSM. Such discrepancies could make the same traffic be classified differently by different 
EFSMs of the same protocol. Therefore, we implement the essential details that describe a 
protocol in a more abstract way. 
4.3.1 Session Initiation Protocol 
For SIP, our state machine implementation is based on the base types of requests defined 












Figure 4-4. Simplified SIP State Machine. 
A certain client starts at the initial state INIT where no connection is established. An 
INVITE request is sent by the client if it wishes to start a call. If the client does not want to 
proceed with the call attempt, it can send a CANCEL request setting the state machine back to 











call and change the state to Call Established. After call establishment, a client can send a Re-
INVITE request if it wishes to move the call to another device without tearing down the session. 
A client can terminate a call by sending a BYE request. Figure 4-4 shows the above described 
state machine of a SIP client. For the sake of simplicity, we have not included the remaining two 
requests, namely, REGISTER and OPTIONS nor have we included the various types of SIP 
responses and message codes in the figure. 
SIP packet verifier is designed to accept messages that are conformant to SIP 
specifications. A SIP message consists of a start-line, one or more header fields, an empty line 
indicating the end of the header fields, and an optional message-body. The start-line, each 
message-header line, and the empty line must be terminated by a carriage-return line-feed 
sequence (CRLF).  The empty line must be present even if the message-body is not.  
For SIP requests, the start line, which is referred to as the request line in this context, 
contains a method name, a Request-URI, and the protocol version separated by a single space 
(SP) character. Method names are discussed in detail in Section 4.2.1. Request-URI, which 
indicates the user or service to which this request is being addressed, must not contain non-
escaped spaces or control characters and must not be enclosed in "<>". The SIP-Version string is 
case-insensitive, and includes the version of SIP in use. 
For SIP responses, the start line, which is referred to as the status line in this context, 
consists of the protocol version followed by a numeric Status-Code and its associated textual 
phrase, with each element separated by a single SP character. The Status-Code is a 3-digit 
integer result code that indicates the outcome of an attempt to understand and satisfy a request 
and is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.1. 
Each header field consists of a field name followed by a colon (":") and the field value. 
Table 4-1 shows the mandatory headers in every SIP request and response and their format. It is 
important to note that the brackets around parameters indicate that they are optional and are not 
part of the header syntax. Whenever (;parameters) appears it indicates that multiple parameters 
can appear in a header and that semicolons separate the parameters. For the sake of simplicity, 






















Table 4-1. Format of mandatory SIP Headers 
Header Name Header Format Examples and Comments 
To To: SIP-URI(;parameters) To: Carol <sip:carol@chicago.com>. The 
display name Carol is optional 
From From: SIP-URI(;parameters) From: Alice 
<sip:alice@atlanta.com>;tag=1928301774. 
The tag parameter contains a random string 
that is used for identification purposes. 
Call-ID Call-ID: unique-id Call-ID: f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-
00a0c91e6bf6@foo.bar.com. Call-IDs are 
case-sensitive and are simply compared 
byte-by-byte. 
CSeq CSeq: digit method CSeq: 4711 INVITE. The method must 
match that of the request. The sequence 
number value must be expressible as a 32-






hds. The protocol name and protocol 
version in the header field must be SIP and 
2.0, respectively.  The Via header field 
value must contain a branch parameter that 
is used to identify the transaction created 
by that request and is used by both the 











Max-Forwards Max-Forwards: digit The value of this header field should 
always be 70. 
Contact Contact: SIP-URI(;parameters) Contact: <sip:alice@pc33.atlanta.com>. 
This header field is mandatory for requests 
that create dialog. 
4.3.2 Run-time Transport Protocol 
For RTP, the implementation of the state machine is simpler due to the lesser number of 
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Figure 4-5. Simplified RTP State Machine. 
A client starts at the initial state INIT where it can either receive or send packets. Upon 
receiving a packet, the state changes to Packet Received. Whilst at that state, a machine can 
either send a packet changing the state to Packet Sent, or remain at the same state receiving more 
packets. Similarly, at the Packet Sent state a machine can either receive packets changing the 
state to Packet Received, or send more packets staying at Packet Sent. Figure 4-5 shows the 











RTP packet verifier follows the protocol specifications when examining packets. Table 4-











Table 4-2. RTP Header Fields Sizes and Requirements 
Header Name Header Format 
Version 2 bits. The version identified by RFC 1889 is 2 
Padding 1 bit. If set, the packet contains one or more 
additional padding octets at the end, which are 
not part of the payload. 
Extension 1 bit. If set, the RTP fixed header is followed 
by exactly one header extension 
CSRC count (CC) 4 bits 
Marker  1 bit 
Payload type 7 bits 
Sequence number 16 bits 
Timestamp 32 bits 
SSRC 32 bits 
CSRC 0 to 15 items, 32 bits each. The number of 
items is given by the CC field. If there are more 
than 15 contributing sources, only 15 may be 
identified. 
4.4  Proposed Architecture 
4.4.1 Architecture Components 
The proposed architecture of our host-based intrusion detection system is shown in figure 























Figure 4-6. System Architecture. 
1. The Filter: It classifies the incoming VoIP traffic into signaling and media packets. 
Currently, the filter supports SIP for signaling and RTP for media delivery. 
2. The Packet Verifier: Its purpose is to validate compliance with protocol syntax according 
to standards. It checks the length of the fields, validates in terms of mandatory fields, and 
examines the structure of the message. This way, many unknown attacks can be detected 
such as attacks aiming at exploiting a vulnerability in the endpoint implementation by 
sending invalid protocol fields which can lead to inadvertent leakage of sensitive network 
topology information, call hijacking, or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
3. The Behavior Observer: The main duty of the behavior observer is to guard against 
semantics anomalies. It performs stateful detection by keeping the Extended Finite State 
Machines of the protocols involved in a call. Protocol EFSMs are designed based on 
protocol specifications, so they can detect any deviation from normal protocol behavior. 
This way, the behavior observer can detect unknown attacks. Each protocol EFSM is 
provided with getter functions, so that other protocol EFSMs can get values of header 











4. The Protocol Table: This table is responsible for defining protocols at a high-level of 
abstraction. Each record in this table defines a specific protocol supported by the 
intrusion detection system, and each field defines a high-level attribute of the protocol. 
This table is meant for organizational purposes and to add some normalization to the 
design of the signature database. The following is a list of the major fields in the Protocol 
Table and their functionality: 
Table 4-3. Example of Protocol Table Content 
Field Name Field Content 1 Field Content 2 
Protocol ID 53 54 
Protocol Name SIP RTP 
Layer Application Layer Application Layer 
Description 
A protocol used for 
session initiation 
A protocol used for real-
time transmission 
• Protocol ID: A unique identifier that identifies the protocol supported by the 
system. 
• Protocol Name: A name given to the protocol. 
• Layer: The layer on which the protocol operates such as transport or application 
layer. 
• Description: As its name suggests, this field describes the protocol and its role in 
the message exchange. 
Table 4-3 shows an example of the content of two records from the protocol table. The 
table shows how our database defines SIP and RTP at a high level. The Protocol ID field 











5. The Field Table: Each record in this table represents a certain field in the protocol’s 
header and a suspicious pattern associated with it. Multiple records in this table can be 
used to form a signature that spans across many fields and protocols. Below, is a list of 
the main fields and their descriptions. 
• Protocol ID: The same as in the Protocol Table and the joiner of the two relations. 
• Field ID: A unique identifier that identifies the field of the protocol header. 
• Field Name: A name given to the field. 
• Description: A description that shows the function of the field. 
• Type: The data type of the field. 
• Pattern: This field usually contains suspicious patterns the administrator is 
interested in detecting. 
• Stand-Alone Pattern: A Boolean field to identify whether the above-described 
pattern forms an attack on its own, or as part of other fields. This feature enables 
the database to hold signatures, which span across multiple fields and multiple 
protocols. 
• Next Protocol ID: If the Stand-Alone Pattern field contains False, this field points 
to the protocol ID of the next field in the multi-field signature. 
• Next Field ID: If the Stand-Alone Pattern field contains False, this field points to 
the field ID of the next field in the multi-field signature. 











Table 4-4. Example of Field Table Content 
Field Name Field Content 1 Field Content 2 
Protocol ID 53 53 
Field ID 1 5 
Field Name Start Line From 
Description 
To distinguish requests from 
responses 
The sender of the message 
Type String String 
Pattern INVITE sip:alice@domain.com 
Stand-alone False False 
Next Protocol ID 53 Null  
Next Field ID 5 Null  
Impact 
INVITE requests from Alice 
should not be received for 
administrative reasons 
INVITE requests from Alice 
should not be received for 
administrative reasons 
Table 4-4 depicts an example of the content of the field table. It shows two records 
representing a signature that includes two SIP’s header fields, namely, the start line and 
from fields. The signature indicates that the system should raise an alert whenever an 
INVITE request is received from sip:alice@domain.com. A False in Stand-alone Pattern 
field instructs the retrieval system to retrieve the record with the Next Protocol ID and 
Next Field ID to form the full signature with the current field. Null values in Next 
Protocol ID and Next Field ID denote the end of the retrieval process  [84]. 











When a session reaches a certain protocol state, the IDS retrieves all the records 
associated with that state from the State Table. A record could contain various values 
suitable for threshold detection such as the upper limit for the number of requests allowed 
within a specific amount of time at that state to avoid Denial of Service saturation attacks. 
Furthermore, a record could contain a stored procedure to be executed upon arriving at 
the certain state. Such a procedure is meant to predict an impending compromise at the 
current system’s safe state, and to limit the damage before it occurs. This strategy stems 
from the fact that for multi-step attacks, there are benign steps that precede the attack 
sequence. The administrator can provide the state table with the necessary procedures to 
be taken at the safe state that precedes the attack. By providing this feature, the State 
Table reflects the design philosophy adopted by State Transition Analysis. It should be 
obvious from the aforementioned description that this table deals with input that has the 
perfect syntax, but is trying to achieve something that violates the semantics of the 
protocol. Hence, it is the semantics-based component of the database. The following is a 
list of the main fields in the table. 
• Protocol ID: The same as in the Protocol Table, and the joiner of the two tables. 
• State ID: A unique identifier that identifies a state in the protocol EFSM. 
• State Name: A name given to the state. 
• Description: A description of the state and the system upon reaching it. 
• Threshold: Identifies the upper limit for the number of requests that can be 
received at this state. 
• Time Unit: Denotes the period of time during which the threshold is measured. 
• Timer: Denotes a value for a timer that can be used at the state. 
• Recommended Action: The procedure that should be executed by the system upon 











• Impact: The effect of the attack on the system. 
Table 4-5. Example of State Table Content 
Field Name Field Content 
Protocol ID 53 
State ID 20 
State Name REGISTER Received 
Description The system state after receiving REGISTER 
Threshold 100 MSG 
Time Unit 1 SEC 
Timer Null 
Recommended Action REGISTER_Procedure( ) 
Impact 
Such action causes Denial of Service (DoS) 
at the Registrar server 
Table 4-5 shows an example of a signature from the state table. The signature shown in 
Table 4-5 indicates that the IDS should raise an alert whenever the number of 
REGISTER messages exceeds 100 within 1 second at the REGISTER Received state. 
4.4.2 How Architecture Components Interact with Each Other 
The filter is the first component to receive the incoming VoIP traffic. It helps classify the 
traffic into signaling and media packets and forward packets to the right verifier. The packet 
verifier receives packets from the filter and parses them. The parsing process examines the 
packet in terms of its size and structure. Too big and malformed packets are rejected by the 











general structure of the packet the verifier starts checking the header fields individually. It 
checks whether mandatory fields are present and if their values are within the limits defined by 
the protocol specifications. After checking compliance with specifications for a certain field, the 
system retrieves all the records of the field from the field table to perform signature detection. If 
approved, packets are sent to the behavior observer.  
The behavior observer keeps track of the session and whether it progresses according to 
specifications. This session awareness is achieved by keeping EFSMs for the protocols involved 
to guard against any unacceptable behavior that violates proper protocol semantics. When 
reaching a certain state in the EFSM, the system retrieves all the records of that state from the 
state table to perform further checks on semantics violations. Clearly, detecting and reporting 
attacks take place in real-time  [72]. 
4.4.3 How Architecture Components Reflect the Formal Model 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the theoretical foundation of our design is based on 
Communicating Extended Finite State Machines and State Transition Analysis Techniques. 
These two formal models are adopted by two components in our design, namely, the Behavior 
Observer and the State Table. In this subsection we show how these two components reflect the 
essence of the formal models they are built upon. 
The Behavior Observer starts by using enumerated values to define EFSM states. In 
addition, it provides state variables associated with each EFSM to act as context variables. Such 
variables can serve various purposes including holding values carried by input or output signals. 
The Behavior Observer has dedicated methods working as predicates to enable transitions based 
on the current state and input signal. Upon enabling a transition, a special method is triggered 
changing the state of the EFSM. Among the methods dedicated by the Behavior Observer are 
those which update the value of the state variables and produce output. The Behavior Observer 
introduces error states to model the case when invalid input is received at a certain state. An 
EFSM in the Behavior Observer does not work as a single independent system, but rather as part 
of a large system of Communicating EFSMs. Therefore, the Behavior Observer provides getter 












Figure 4-7 delineates the relationship between the State Table, and State Transition 
Analysis Techniques. In the figure, a State Table lies on the right side, whereas attacks 
represented by State Transition Analysis lie on the left. Each record in the State Table represents 
a safe state in State Transition Analysis. As mentioned earlier, a safe state usually precedes a 
compromised one. A compromised state can be predicted and dealt with using the stored 
procedure that forms an important part in every record in the State Table. Stored procedures use 
Threshold and Timer fields associated with records to provide more flexible detection 
parameters. Furthermore, Thresholds and the associated Time Units in the State Table can be 
used to extend the capabilities of State Transition Analysis to detect Denial of Service attacks 
and the likes. Therefore, the State Table adopts the design approach of State Transition Analysis 
bringing semantics awareness to attack modeling and improves the same approach to model 































Figure 4-7. The Relationship Between The State Table and State Transition Analysis. 
4.5  Advantages of Architecture 











signature-based modules. The behavior observer performs stateful detection by keeping 
the EFSMs of all the involved protocols and assembling state from multiple packets. It also 
performs cross-protocol detection by providing external interfaces between protocol 
EFSMs in the form of callable functions which return values of important protocol state 
variables. On the other hand, signature-based modules have a sense of statefulness and 
cross-protocol awareness. The field table has the ability to store signatures that cross 
protocol boundaries. Furthermore, the state table follows the progress of protocol sessions 
carefully providing stateful detection. The functions stored in the Recommended Action 
field have the ability to perform cross-protocol detection. 
2. The design of the database tables is simple and clean. This advantage is achieved by 
separating the anomalies in protocol traffic from specific attacks. The packet verifier and 
behavior observer eliminate anomalies according to protocol specifications. They also 
remove ambiguities in the incoming traffic which lets the field table and the state table 
focus on the modeling of specific attacks rather than all anomalous behaviors. For 
example, if the packet verifier were not present in the design, we would have – somehow – 
to store signatures for all malformed SIP messages. Bearing in mind that there are different 
types of SIP messages, and for each message there are multiple headers with different 
combinations, we would end up storing a huge number of signatures. Since signatures are 
stored in the external memory which has a considerably longer access time than the 
random access memory, simplifying the design and limiting the number of signatures 
should be a goal sought by IDS designers. 
3. Our design maintains a reasonable balance between database normalization and 
performance. A normalized database has many one-to-one relationships, and many tables 
to reflect these relationships. Such a design suggests small tables with a relatively few 
attributes for each. Although high normalization provides a clearer overview on the 
database for designers, it usually comes at the expense of retrieval time. For example, the 
primary type of information in Snort system  [26] which is called the event, is represented 
in no less than six tables. Accessing the information of a single event may require joining 
six or more tables which could affect performance negatively  [42]. The number of tables to 











other hand, and as shown in figure 4-8, we provide a less normalized database (two levels 
of hierarchy) with more attributes per table. A signature in our database is entirely stored 
in a single table (either field or state table). For reporting purposes, another table (the 
protocol table) is accessed, which puts the cost of accessing information in our database at 
no more than two tables. Furthermore, unlike other comparable signature databases, a 
cross-protocol signature can be stored in a single table (either field or state table), which 
benefits the performance positively. 
. . . . . . . . . . UDP
. . . . . . . . . . RTP
. . . . .. . . . . SIP
Protocol Table
. . . . . . . . . . Field3
. . . . . . . . . . Field2
. . . . .. . . . . Field1
. . . . . . . . . . State3
. . . . . . . . . . State2
. . . . .. . . . . State1
State TableField Table
 
Figure 4-8. A High-level Hierarchy of the database. 
4. Our system can thwart obfuscation attempts made by attackers to evade detection. 
Obfuscation is a technique used by attackers to introduce slight modifications in a certain 
penetration hoping to do the same damage, without being detected by the signature 
database that stores a signature for the unmodified penetration. Thus, even if the attack 
scenario is represented in the signature database, a minor variation of the attack can go 
unnoticed. Our system tackles this problem by representing attacks in the state table using 
a higher-level representation. Upon reaching the safe state that precedes a compromised 
one in an attack, the system executes the procedure in the Recommended Action field. Such 











the attack. Furthermore, more than one procedure can be stored in the Recommended 
Action field to add more flexibility and deal with more variants of the attack  [84]. 
5. Extending State Transition Analysis Techniques and combining them with specification-
based ones allow our IDS to detect attacks that are difficult to detect using either of the 
approaches. Denial of Service attacks and variations from normal usage are clear examples 
of attacks that cannot be represented easily by State Transition Diagrams  [39] which form 
the base of our EFSM model and State Transition Analysis techniques. However, by 
improving State Transition Analysis and incorporating it into specification-based module 
that uses EFSMs, we are able to detect the abovementioned attacks efficiently.  
4.6 Implemented Attacks and Detection Methodologies 
We implement six attacks to demonstrate the functionality of the intrusion detection 
system at the application layer. The attacks are launched exploiting various vulnerabilities in SIP 
as a signaling protocol and RTP as media transport protocol. The implemented attacks can be 
classified either as flooding attacks, message flow attacks, or parser attacks. Some of these 
attacks can be found in classifications such as the one released by VoIPSA for threats that IP 
telephony is vulnerable to  [41]. Such attacks are common in VoIP environments since current 
SIP specifications do not mandate authentication for all types of requests used by the protocol. 
Furthermore, existing security mechanisms that guarantee message integrity, confidentiality, and 
origin authentication can only protect against outsiders and not against insiders who abuse their 
privileges. The rest of this section discusses the attacks and the detection methodology for each 
4.6.1 The BYE Attack 
As mentioned earlier, a BYE request can be sent by either the caller or the callee to 
terminate the session. An attacker can abuse this feature by sending this message to either the 
caller or the callee to fool them into tearing down the session prematurely. The User Agent that 
receives the faked BYE message will immediately stop sending RTP packets, whereas the other 
User Agent will continue sending its RTP packets. BYE attack is common in VoIP environments 











attack to insert a BYE request into the session. Wherever there is no authentication mechanism 
in place, and considering the attacker’s ability to discover the current session parameters, this 
attack can be launched successfully. BYE attack is considered a Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
Table 4-6. BYE Attack Signature 
Field Name Field Content 
Protocol ID 53 
State ID 30 
State Name BYE Received 
Description The system state after receiving BYE 
Threshold Null  
Time Unit Null  
Timer 20 MSEC 
Recommended Action BYE_Procedure( )  
Impact 
Such action causes Denial of Service (DoS) at 
the endpoint 
Although BYE attack occurs within the signaling protocol (SIP), checking the status of 
RTP flow in the endpoint is vital in the detection process. A genuine BYE sender will stop 
sending RTP packets immediately after sending a BYE message. Receiving RTP packets from 
the original sender on the original port after seeing the BYE message is an indicator of a BYE 
attack. To detect such an attack, we store a signature in the state table of our database. The 
stored signature represents the state of a SIP session upon receiving a BYE message. We set a 
value to the timer field in the signature. The recommended action includes a cross-protocol 
detection procedure that checks RTP status after receiving the BYE message. If the system 











place. Table 4-6 shows the signature. The pseudo-code of BYE_Procedure( ) which is the 
recommended action appears in figure 4-9. 
Procedure BYE_Procedure ( ) 
    while (Timer > 0) 
       { if (RTP packets are received from original address) 
                 Raise_Alarm (BYE_attack) 
          else 
                              Timer = Timer -1   
                    } 
Figure 4-9. The Pseudo-code for BYE Attack Detection. 
In this example we choose the Timer value to be 20 milliseconds, which is the time each 
voice packet represents on average. 
A point worth noting is that network conditions could scupper the aforementioned 
strategy. If RTP packets are delayed beyond the average time after receiving a legitimate BYE 
request due to network congestion, our database will generate a false positive. 
4.6.2 The Re-INVITE Attack 
Another name for this attack is Call Hijacking. SIP clients use Re-INVITE message if 
they want to move the phone call from one device to another without tearing down the session. 
This feature is called call migrating. An attacker can abuse this feature by sending a Re-INVITE 
message to one of the parties involved in a session to fool it into believing that the other party is 
going to change its IP address to a new address. The new address is controlled by the attacker. 
This attack can be seen as a DoS attack. Furthermore, it breaches the privacy of the call since the 
attacker will be able to receive voice that is not meant for it. Lack of authentication enables 











To detect Re-INVITE attacks we use an approach similar to the one used to detect BYE 
attacks. Clearly, continuing to receive RTP packets from the original address on the original port 
after receiving a Re-INVITE denotes a call hijacking attempt. We create a signature in the state 
table denoting the system state upon receiving a Re-INVITE. Similar to the approach used in 
BYE attack, we set a value to the timer field in the signature. 
Similar to BYE attack, if a benign Re-INVITE arrives before RTP packets due to taking a 
different path or any other network conditions, the system will raise a false flag. Packets between 
two endpoints in an IP-based network are not confined to a certain route. Such a scenario is rare 
although it is possible. 
4.6.3 The CANCEL Attack 
CANCEL message is sent if the caller decides not to proceed with the call attempt. It 
asks the callee to cease processing the previous request and generate an error response 
designating that request. It is sent usually after receiving a provisional response from the callee. 
Provisional responses indicate that the request has been received, and is being processed by the 
callee. Without proper authentication, the receiving user agent cannot differentiate a faked 
CANCEL message from a genuine one, which leads to a denial of communication between user 
agents. 
Our system detects this attempt by carefully monitoring the behavior of the signaling 
protocol in the behavior observer. Sending a CANCEL after receiving OK response or not 
receiving a provisional response would be incorrect protocol behavior. Deploying our IDS 
prototype on all components of the network guarantees that CANCEL is sent only if a 
provisional response is received and any OK response is not received. This way the attack is 
detected early on the attacker side. This detection methodology shows the statefulness and 
compliance to specifications of our system. It is important to realize that CANCEL attack can be 
detected by our system without having to encode its pattern or store its signature. The behavior 
observer which follows correct protocol behavior is able to detect the attack without priori 












4.6.4 The REGISTER Flooding Attack 
Overwhelming victim resources by flooding it with malicious traffic is the most basic and 
probably the most difficult to defend against DoS attack. A number of SIP clients can launch a 
REGISTER flooding attack to swamp a single registrar server within a short duration of time. 
REGISTER requests are accepted by registrar servers to store a binding between a user’s SIP 
address and the address of the host where the user is currently residing or wishing to receive 
requests. REGISTER flooding attack can be viewed as a DoS attack. Even proper authentication 
would not stop such an attack if the attackers are insiders with bad intentions. 
To detect this attack, we create a signature in the state table denoting the system state 
upon receiving a REGISTER request. Two values are set to the Threshold and Time Unit fields 
respectively. Whenever the number of REGISTER requests exceeds the threshold within the 
specified time unit, the system raises a REGISTER flooding attack flag. 
4.6.5 Voice Injection Attack 
This attack targets RTP which is used to carry call data such as voice and video. Lack of 
integrity checking could allow an attacker to inject an alternative RTP stream to one of the 
parties involved in a session. An attacker can send artificial RTP packets with higher sequence 
numbers than the original ones, which causes the receiver to play the artificial ones instead. 
To detect such an attack we can store a signature in the state table to denote the system 
state upon receiving an RTP packet. A special procedure in the Recommended Action field 
should compare the sequence number of the packet to that of the previous one. Whenever there is 












Table 4-7. Voice Injection Signature 
Field Name Field Content 
Protocol ID 54 
State ID 7 
State Name RTP Received 
Description The system state after receiving an RTP packet 
Threshold 50  
Time Unit Null  
Timer Null 
Recommended Action Voice_inj_Procedure( )  
Impact 
Such action causes Denial of Service (DoS) at 
the endpoint 
4.6.6 Malformed Messages Attack 
Attackers can create extra-long messages with fields of increased length or huge message 
body. They can also omit some of the mandatory fields in the messages being sent. Such an 
attack targets the protocol parser at the endpoint and aims at depleting its processing power and 
increasing its network utilization. Different implementations of the protocol could respond to 
such messages in different ways. It is likely that attackers try various malformed message 
combinations to discover a flaw in the end system. In addition, such malformed messages could 
lead some endpoints to crash which is considered a DoS situation. Malformed messages attack 
targets both signaling and transport protocols. 
To detect such attacks the packet verifier provides input validation for the incoming 











the protocol specifications in terms of field presence, length, and other criteria. Therefore, the 
system does not have to possess priori knowledge of the attack signature to detect it. 
4.7 Attack Summary 
Table 4-8 recapitulates the attacks mentioned in the previous section. For each attack, we 
provide a brief description and the violation type. 
Table 4-8. Application Layer Attack Summary 
Attack Name Brief Description Violation Type 
BYE Attack A faked request sent by attackers to fool the 




Re-INVITE Attack A faked request sent by attackers to one of the 
parties involved in a session to fool it into 
redirecting the call to the attacker. 
Protocol-Semantics 
Violation 
CANCEL Attack A faked request sent by attackers to cancel a 
call attempt made by legitimate users. 
Protocol-Semantics 
Violation 
Malformed Messages Malformed protocol messages created by 
attackers to hamper victim processing 
Protocol-Syntax 
Violation 
REGISTER Flooding Overwhelming registrar servers with too 
many requests within a short time. 
Protocol-Semantics 
Violation 
Voice Injection Injecting an alternative voice stream to one of 
the parties involved in a session. 
Protocol-Semantics 
Violation 
4.8 Chapter Discussion 











point of view. It started by mentioning the two major protocols involved in SIP-based IP 
telephony, namely, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). 
The roles played by these protocols in a call, their message formats, and threat models were 
mentioned preparing the reader to apprehend the magnitude of the threats. The specifications of 
the involved protocols were developed based on abstract models that focus on the essential 
details of each protocol, and the benefits of that decision were mentioned. 
The chapter then thrashed out the design of the proposed architecture focusing on its 
components and their interaction with each other. The faithfulness of our design to the formal 
models of Extended Finite State Machines and State Transition Analysis was clearly shown. The 
chapter discussed thoroughly the advantages of the proposed design. These advantages included 
cross-protocol and stateful detection in specification and signature-based modules, efficiency in 
storing signatures and retrieving them, and resisting obfuscation. Most importantly, we showed 
how our design improved the formal model to detect attacks that were hard to detect previously. 
A variety of attacks were shown alongside their detection methodologies to highlight the 
system’s ability and versatility. Next chapter will continue with the design addressing lower 











Chapter 5 Extending the Design to Lower Layers  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we started a thorough discussion on the design of our intrusion 
detection system. As an introduction we shed some light on the involved protocols with their 
threat model and how their specifications were developed. Then we dived into the details of our 
proposed host-based intrusion detection architecture dissecting its components and highlighting 
its advantages. Six implemented attacks with their detection methodologies were discussed 
showing the capabilities of our system. 
In this chapter we follow the same path that was started in the previous chapter. 
However, we shift our focus from application layer protocols to protocols at lower layers. Our 
discussion will follow the same systematic approach to show how our design addresses lower 
layer issues using the same principles utilized for application layer. 
5.2 Related Protocols and Threat Model 
TCP/IP networking is implemented in a layered fashion that has four levels  [43]. The 
previous chapter dealt with the application layer level that is seen by the average user. The 
Transport layer and Network layer levels are the focus of this chapter. The lowest level which is 
the Network Interface layer has the task of interfacing with the network hardware. Special 
protocols are implemented at the Network Interface layer level for data transmission across 
different kinds of networks.  Attacks that target protocols at this level are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, so they will not be covered in any detail. 
The Network layer handles communication from one machine to another. It accepts a 
request to send a packet from the Transport layer along with an identification of the machine to 
which the packet should be sent. This layer defines the basic unit of transfer across the network 
and includes the concepts of destination addressing and routing  [44].  











provides communication from one application program to another. Such communication is often 
called end-to-end  [44].  
5.2.1 Internet Protocol (IP) 
The most fundamental TCP/IP internet service consists of a packet delivery system. The 
service is defined as an unreliable, best-effort, connectionless packet delivery system. It is 
unreliable because packets may be lost, duplicated, delayed, or delivered out of order without the 
service detecting such conditions or informing the sender or receiver. The service is 
connectionless because each packet is treated independently from all others and may travel over 
a different path from the rest. The service is best-effort because it does its best to deliver packets. 
However, exhaustion of resources or failure of underlying network could scupper that best effort. 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is the protocol that defines the delivery system described in the 
previous paragraph. It defines the basic unit of data transfer used throughout the TCP/IP internet. 
Furthermore, the IP software performs the routing function, choosing a path over which packets 
will be sent. Therefore, IP is the underlying language that all machines on the Internet must 
understand in order to communicate. Figure 5-1 shows the IP packet format. 
The Version field is always set to 4 indicating IPv4. The length field gives the packet 
header length in 32-bit words. The service type field specifies how the packet should be handled 
and routed. The Total Length field gives the length of the packet in bytes. Each packet has an 
identifier contained in the identification field. The Flags and Fragment Offset fields are used 
when the packet is too large to traverse a given network and must be broken into smaller packets. 
The Time To Live field specifies how long the packet is allowed to remain in the internet 
system. Each gateway that handles a packet decrements the Time To Live field, and the packet 
gets dropped when the field reaches zero. The Protocol field tells which protocol is used by the 
Transport layer. The Header Checksum ensures integrity of header values. Fields Source IP 
Address and Destination IP Address contain the 32-bit IP addresses of the packet’s sender and 













Figure 5-1. IP Packet Format. 
5.2.2 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
If IP software on a gateway cannot route or deliver a packet due to the unavailability of 
the destination machine, or if the gateway detects an unusual condition, like network congestion, 
that affects its ability to forward the packet, the original source of the packet needs to be 
instructed to take actions to avoid or correct the problem. To allow gateways to report errors or 
provide information about such unexpected circumstances, the Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) is implemented as part of IP implementation. ICMP is used to send error 
messages or other information pertinent to the functioning of the network. It provides 
communication between the IP software on one machine and the IP software on another. 
Although each ICMP message has its own format, they all begin with the same three 
fields: the Type field that identifies the message and defines its meaning and format, the Code 
field that provides further information about the message type, and the Checksum field which 
insures integrity. The Data field of ICMP messages can contain extra header fields for specific 
types and codes. Figure 5-2 shows the ICMP general header, whereas Table 5-1 contains a 
description of the message types. 
 Version  Length Total Length 
Source IP Address 
Service Type 
Identification Flags Fragment Offset 
Time To Live Protocol Header Checksum 













Table 5-1. ICMP Message Types 
Type Description Purpose 
0 Echo Reply Query 
         3 Destination Unreachable Error 
4 Source Quench Error 
5 Redirect Error 
8 Echo Request (Ping) Query 
9 Router Advertisement Query 
10 Router Solicitation Query  
11 Time Exceeded Error 
12 Parameter Problem Error 
13 Timestamp Request Query 
14 Timestamp Reply Query 
15 Information Request Query 
16 Information Reply Query 
17 Address Mask Request Query 













Figure 5-2. ICMP Header. 
5.2.3 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides a mode of communication between 
applications. UDP implements the concept of protocol ports used to communicate with different 
applications. Protocol ports are logical constructs rather than physical ones. Each protocol port is 
identified by a positive 16-bit integer. The local operating system on a machine provides an 
interface mechanism that applications use to specify a port or access it. To communicate with a 
foreign port, a sender needs to know both the IP address of the destination machine and the 
protocol port number of the destination application within that machine. UDP provides protocol 
ports to distinguish among multiple applications executing on a single machine. It uses the 
underlying IP and provides unreliable connectionless packet delivery. 
 
Figure 5-3. UDP Header. 
The UDP header appears in figure 5-3. The Source Port and Destination Port fields 
contain the 16-bit UDP protocol port number used to direct packets to applications waiting to 
receive them. When the Source Port is used, it specifies the port to which replies should be sent. 
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the user data. The Checksum field is used to insure integrity.  
5.2.4 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, the lowest level of service provided by a TCP/IP network 
is the unreliable packet delivery system. In such a system packets can be lost due to transmission 
errors or hardware failures. Furthermore, packets can be delivered out of order or after a 
substantial delay. Such an unreliable connectionless delivery system can hinder the operation of 
application programs that need to send large volumes of data from one machine to another. 
Application programmers in this system are required to build error detection and recovery into 
their applications which entails a special technical background possessed by few application 
programmers. Therefore, a reliable transport service on top of the unreliable connectionless one 
was proposed to provide reliable stream delivery system to be used by all application programs. 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the protocol that implements reliable 
communication on the Internet. It implements the concept of a connection which can be thought 
of as a communication channel, where both sides have agreed on the communication, and 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure that all packets arrive unchanged at their destination. TCP 
has several key features that provide reliability. First, TCP acknowledges the receipt of each 
packet. It maintains a timer, and if the acknowledgement is not received within the predefined 
time limit, it resends the packet. Second, it includes a unique identifier for each packet to ensure 
that the receiving application can reconstruct the correct order and also detect when packets are 
lost. Finally, TCP ensures that the sending machine never sends too much data to be stored in the 
receiver’s buffer.  
Figure 5-4 depicts the TCP header. The Source Port and Destination Port fields play the 
same role played by the Source Port and Destination Port fields in the UDP header, indicating 
which application is the sender and recipient of the packet. The 32-bit Sequence and 
Acknowledgment numbers are used to ensure that the packet ordering is maintained and that no 
packets are lost. The Length field includes the length of the header in 32-bit multiples. The 
Reserved field is an area reserved for future extensions to TCP. The Flags are bit values within a 











Urgent pointer (which will be discussed shortly) is valid. ACK flag is used to acknowledge the 
receipt of a packet. PSH flag indicates that the data should be pushed up to the application as 
soon as possible. The RST flag resets the connection. SYN flag is used to initiate the connection 
and synchronize it. The FIN flag is used to finish the connection and to indicate that the sender is 
done sending data. The Window Size is the number of bytes that the receiver is willing to accept. 
The Checksum is used to ensure the integrity of the packet. The Urgent pointer is a way for an 
application to send emergency data to the receiver. When the Urgent flag is set, the Urgent 
pointer carries the offset to be added to the current sequence number to indicate the last byte of 
the urgent data. The Options provide various choices for the connection. 
 
Figure 5-4. TCP Header. 
5.2.5 Threat Model 
Ever since Bellovin’s paper on the security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite  [45], 
dozens of papers have been published on the same issue. The way TCP accepts new connections 
allows attackers to launch denial-of-service attacks to prevent anyone from using a particular 
host. Generally, attackers can take advantage of the stateful nature of TCP to cripple the protocol 
whilst in a certain state. The lack of built-in authentication with IP packets makes it easy for 
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attackers to spoof packet addresses and get unauthorized privileges. Some could argue that lower 
layers attacks are probably not effective in today’s environments for they have been around for a 
long time. However, due to software reuse and potential coding errors in future systems, there is 
always the possibility that these attacks, like any other, may become effective once again against 
some future systems  [46]. Some recent reports on the performance of a newly released version of 
Microsoft Windows Vista proved the effectiveness of some of these attacks against the protocol 
stack of the operating system  [47]. That was despite the fact that Microsoft removed a large body 
of tried and tested code and replaced it with freshly written code. 
5.3 Specification Development 
Our specifications for IP, ICMP, UDP and TCP EFSMs and packet verifiers are based on 
RFCs 791  [48], 792  [49], 768  [50] and 793  [51] respectively. In developing the state machine 
specifications, we have followed the same approach mentioned in Section 4.3 by implementing 
the essential details of each protocol. Using more abstract specifications provides a twofold 
benefit. First, specification development becomes less tedious and time-consuming. Second, the 
IDS gets to avoid undue false alarms that result from differences in traffic interpretation. For the 
packet verifiers, we have benefited from some previous works in the area of traffic 
normalization  [83] to address the issues related to ambiguities in the traffic stream that are 
exploitable by attackers to either evade detection or launch various probing and unknown 
attacks. 
5.3.1 Internet Protocol 
Figure 5-5 shows a simplified IP state machine for a client. The state machine starts at 
the initial state INIT where it can make a transition to either Packet Sent or Packet Received 
state. Upon receiving an IP packet, the state machine makes a transition to the Packet Received 
state. Whilst in this state, the state machine can receive more IP packets staying at the same state 
or send IP packets making a transition to Packet Sent state. Whilst in the Packet Sent state, the 
state machine can continue sending more IP packets staying at the same state or receiving IP 












Table 5-2. Some IP Header Constraints 
Header Name Checks Performed 
Version For IPv4, this field must have the value 4. 
Header Length If the value of this header is less than 20 bytes or more 
than the packet length, the packet is dropped. 
Total Length If this field exceeds the actual length of the packet, the 
packet is dropped. Otherwise, the packet is trimmed to the 
length indicated by the field. 
Protocol In our case, we enforce the use of either TCP or UDP in 
this field. 
Header Checksum Any packet with incorrect header checksum is dropped. 
IP Source and Destination 
Addresses 
Any packet with invalid IP addresses is dropped. 
Examples of invalid IP addresses are localhost and 
b oadcast addresses. 
IP Options In our case, we remove any IP options from the packet. 
Not all options are implemented by all machines. For the 
most part, they are not used in modern networks, and some 
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Figure 5-5. Simplified IP State Machine. 
Table 5-2 shows how our IP packet verifier addresses some of the issues related to packet 
headers and their associated values. 
Since we are implementing a host-based intrusion detection system, we have not 
mentioned the header fields that are more related to the operation of networks and network-based 
intrusion detection systems. 
5.3.2 Internet Control Message Protocol 

















Table 5-3. Some ICMP Constraints 
ICMP Type Checks Performed 
Echo request (ping) If the destination of the message is either a multicast or 
broadcast address, the message is dropped. Such action 
prevents the host from participating in a Smurf attack (will 
be discussed shortly). If the checksum is incorrect, the 
packet is dropped. The Code field is set to Zero. 
Echo reply If the checksum is incorrect, the packet is dropped. If the 
reply does not match a request, the packet is dropped. The 
Code field is set to Zero. 
Source Quench Source quench requests are dropped to prevent possible 
Denial of Service attacks. Such a measure is justifiable 
since routers in IP are not allowed to originate a source 
quench and are not obligated to act on a received source 






































By sending an error message, the machine makes a transition to the Error Sent state. 
Sending more error messages keeps the state machine at this state. By sending a request 
message, the machine makes a transition from the INIT state to the Request Sent state. At the 
Request Sent state a machine can either send more requests staying at the same state or receive 
replies moving to the Reply Received state. Figure 5-6 shows a simplified ICMP state machine. 
Table 5-3 shows some of the measures taken by ICMP packet verifier to deal with 
requests and replies. 
5.3.3 User Datagram Protocol 
A UDP state machine starts at the initial state INIT where it can make a transition either 
to Packet Received or Packet Sent state. Upon receiving a UDP packet, the machine moves to the 
Packet Received state. Whilst at the Packet Received state, the machine can either keep receiving 
more packets to stay at the same state or send packets to move to the Packet Sent state. Similarly, 
at the Packet Sent state the machine can either keep sending more packets to stay at the same 
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Table 5-4 shows some of the measures taken by UDP packet verifier to deal with some 
header fields. 
Table 5-4. Some UDP Constraints 
UDP Field Checks Performed 
Length If the value of this field does not match the length as 
indicated by IP total length, the packet is dropped. 
Checksum If the checksum is incorrect, the packet is dropped. 
5.3.4 The Transmission Control Protocol 
A TCP state machine starts at the initial INIT state. For a TCP server application at this 
state, a passive open command is issued to wait for a conn ction from another machine. The 
passive open command results in a transition made by the state machine to the Listen state, 
where the server application is willing to accept connections. When a TCP client application 
wants to establish a connection with a server, it sends a TCP packet with the SYN flag set. Upon 
receiving the packet, the TCP server application sends a packet with SYN and ACK flags set and 
moves to the SYN Received state. A received RST packet at this state changes the state to Listen. 
Upon receiving the acknowledgement from the client, the server makes a transition to the 
Established state and data transfer can take place accordingly. When a TCP client application 
wants to tear down the connection, it sends a packet with the FIN flag set to the server. Upon 
receiving the FIN packet the server sends a packet to the client with the FIN and ACK flags set, 
which closes communication from the client to the sever and makes a transition to Close Wait 
state. At this stage, the server can continue sending packets to the client until it sends its closing 

































Figure 5-8. Simplified TCP State Machine. 
It should be obvious that the abovementioned description of a TCP state machine applies 
to a server application. A TCP state machine that describes a client application would have slight 
differences in the form of some disparate states and transitions. For instance, a client application 
at the INIT state sends a SYN packet to a server to initiate a connection moving to the SYN Sent 
state. When a client application sends a FIN packet to end the connection, it moves to the FIN 
Wait 1 state, where it waits for the server’s acknowledgment. Upon receiving the 
acknowledgment, the client application makes a transition to the FIN Wait 2 state, receives a 
final FIN packet from the server and acknowledges it, and closes the connection after a 
predefined amount of time. To keep things simple, we only show the states and transitions of a 
TCP state machine describing a server application in figure 5-8. 












Table 5-5. Some TCP Constraints 
TCP Field Checks Performed 
SYN If SYN=1 and RST=1, the packet is dropped. If SYN=1 
and FIN=1, the FIN flag is cleared. If SYN=0 and ACK=0 
and RST=0, the packet is dropped. If SYN=1, the packet 
data are removed. 
RST If RST=1, the packet data are removed. 
FIN If FIN=1 and ACK=0, the packet is dropped. 
PUSH If PUSH=1 and ACK=0, the packet is dropped. 
URG If URG=1 and ACK=0, the packet is dropped. 
Header Len If the value of this field is less than 5 or beyond the end of 
packet, the packet is dropped. 
Reserved In our case, we remove any values in this field. 
Checksum If the checksum is incorrect, the packet is dropped. 
It is clear from table 5-5 that all the checks are performed to insure adherence to the 
protocol specifications. For example, a TCP packet with SYN flag set is meant to initiate a 
connection and hence it should not carry data. 
5.4 Extended Architecture 
To accommodate the protocols discussed in section 5.2, we extend the system 
architecture that was detailed in section 4.4 to cover the threats posed by lower layer protocols. 


























Figure 5-9. Extended System Architecture. 
The system architecture that was discussed in the previous chapter is cloned for the 
transport and network layers. The cloning aims at addressing the threats and vulnerabilities of 
lower layers using the same principles utilized at the application layer. For instance, the Filter 
classifies the traffic based on the active protocols at the receiving layer and forwards packets to 
the right verifier. It classifies the packets coming from the network layer to the transport layer 
into TCP and UDP packets. Furthermore, various signature database tables in the extended 
architecture are used to store information on lower layer protocols in exactly the same way used 
with application layer protocols. 
5.5 Advantages of Extended Architecture 
In addition to all the advantages mentioned in Section 4.5, our architecture provides 
cross-layer detection in specification-based and signature-based modules. Protocols at a lower 
layer append information to the messages crossing to upper layers. The behavior observer 
performs cross-layer detection by using such information to make more informed decisions on 
potential attacks. The field table has the ability to store signatures that cross layer boundaries. 
Furthermore, the functions stored in the Recommended Action field of the state table have the 











Protocol layering has conceptual and structural advantages. It provides a structural way 
to discuss system components. Modularity makes it easier to update system components. 
However, some researchers and networking engineers are vehemently opposed to layering  [52]. 
One potential drawback of layering is that one layer may duplicate lower-layer functionality. For 
example, many protocol stacks provide error recovery on both a link basis and an end-to-end 
basis. A second potential drawback is that functionality at one layer may need information (for 
example, a timestamp value) that is present only in another layer, which violates the goal of 
separation of layers  [53]. 
5.6 Implemented Attacks and Detection Methodologies 
We implement nine attacks to demonstrate the functionality of the intrusion detection 
system at network and transport layer. The implemented attacks have been widely used to test 
intrusion detection systems. These attacks target protocols such as TCP, UDP, ICMP, and IP and 
can be found in data sets such as 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation  [54]. The rest of 
this section discusses the attacks and the detection methodology for each. 
5.6.1 UDP Storm 
This attack causes two machines to attack each other. The idea is that there are a number 
of ports that will respond with another packet if a packet is sent. For example, Echo (port 7) will 
echo a packet back, while Chargen (port 19) will generate a stream of characters. Consider a 
UDP packet with source port 7 and destination port 19. The packet generates some characters 
from the destination machine, headed for the echo port of the source machine. The source 
machine echoes these packets back, generating even more packets, and so on. Eventually, both 
machines are spending all their time sending packets back and forth which could result in a 











Table 5-6. UDP Storm Signature 
Field Name Field Content 1 Field Content 2 
Protocol ID 25 25 
Field ID 1 2 
Field Name Source Port Destination Port 
Description 
The source port of the sender 
of the packet 
The destination port of the 
receiver of the packet 
Type Number Number 
Pattern 7 19 
Stand-alone False False 
Next Protocol ID 25 Null 
Next Field ID 2 Null 
Impact 
Such action causes Denial of 
Service (DoS) at the endpoint 
Such action causes Denial of 
Service (DoS) at the endpoint 
To detect such an attack we create a signature in the field table for the source and 
destination port fields. Whenever an incoming UDP packet has the number 7 in its Source port 
and the number 19 in its Destination port, a UDP storm flag is raised by the system. Table 5-6 












5.6.2 Land Attack 
In this attack, a TCP SYN packet is constructed with the source and destination IP 
addresses the same and both set to the target machine.  A direct impact of this attack is causing 
the target to reply to itself which could result in the machine being locked up or unresponsive. 
Attackers launching this attack take advantage of the lack of built-in authentication in IP which 
makes it easy to spoof packet addresses. Land attack can be considered a DoS attack. 
Table 5-7. Land Attack Signature 
Field Name Field Content 
Protocol ID 26 
State ID 5 
State Name SYN Packet Received 
Description The system state after receiving SYN packet 
Threshold Null  
Time Unit Null 
Timer Null 
Recommended Action SYN_Rec_Procedure( ) 
Impact 
Such action causes Denial of Service (DoS) at 
the endpoint 
To detect this attack a signature is created in the State table representing TCP state upon 
receiving a SYN packet. The recommended action field includes a cross-protocol procedure that 











behavior observer can be used to store and compare IP addresses. Table 5-7 shows the signature. 
The number 26 is used as a protocol ID for TCP. 
5.6.3 Blat Attack 
This attack is an advanced version of the land attack. In addition to spoofing IP 
addresses, the attacker sends a TCP SYN packet to the target with an urgent pointer that points 
beyond the end of the packet. In some stack implementations this could lead to crashes and 
unresponsiveness. 
Blat attack can be detected by our packet verifier which ensures that all fields of the 
packet header have appropriate values that are conformant to specifications. Clearly, a value that 
is greater than the end of the packet in the urgent pointer violates protocol specifications. 
Therefore, a priori knowledge of the signature of this attack is not required to perform detection. 
5.6.4 Smurf Attack 
Smurf attack is a way of generating a lot of traffic targeting a victim host. The attack 
floods the target system via spoofed broadcast echo request (ping) messages. The attacker 
constructs echo requests (ping) with the target as the source IP and broadcast them to an 
intermediary network to maximize the number of machines responding. The machines at the 
intermediary network all respond to the echo request with packets destined for the target 
machine. The target machine cannot process the large number of packets received and goes 
down under the load. Two main factors contribute to the success of Smurf attack, namely, the 
absence of cryptographic authentication at the network layer which allows attackers to spoof 
addresses, and poor network configuration by administrators which allows attackers to use 
networks as intermediaries. 
A signature can be stored in the State Table representing the state of ICMP upon 
receiving an echo request. Two values are set to the Threshold and Time Unit respectively. 
Whenever the number of arriving echo requests exceeds the Threshold within the Time unit, a 
Smurf attack flag is raised. Table 5-8 shows the signature. The pseudo-code of the recommended 












Table 5-8. Smurf Attack Signature 
Field Name Field Content 
Protocol ID 21 
State ID 2 
State Name Echo Request Received 
Description 
The system state after receiving an echo 
request 
Threshold 100 
Time Unit 500 MSEC 
Timer Null 
Recommended Action Smurf_Procedure( ) 
Impact 
Such action causes Denial of Service (DoS) at 
the endpoint 
Procedure Smurf_Procedure ( ) 
                   while (Time_Unit > 0) 
                     {   
                        if (echo_request is received) 
                           number_of_requests = number_of_requests + 1 
                           if (number_of_requests >= Threshold) 











                           else  
                               Time_Unit = Time_Unit - 1 
                        else 
                           Time_Unit = Time_Unit - 1  } 
Figure 5-10. The Pseudo-code for Smurf Attack Detection. 
5.6.5 Neptune 
Neptune, or “SYN flood”, exploits the way a connection is established in TCP. In this 
attack, an attacker sends a SYN packet to a server using a spoofed IP address initiating a 
connection. The spoofed packet source address used by the attacker is unreachable. Therefore, 
the attacker never responds to the SYN/ACK packet from the server, which leads to a situation 
known as “half-open” TCP connection on the server. For each half-open TCP connection made 
to a server, the TCP software creates a record in a data structure to hold the information about 
the connection. If the connection is not completed within a certain amount of time, the 
connection times out and the record is freed. If attackers can initialize enough connections before 
the timeout occurs, the data structure can overflow, causing a segmentation fault and locking up 
the computer.  
A signature can be stored in the State Table representing the state of TCP upon receiving 
a SYN packet. Two values are set to the Threshold and Time Unit respectively. Whenever the 
number of arriving SYN packets exceeds the Threshold within the Time unit, the procedure in 
the Recommended Action field can raise a Neptune attack flag. 
5.6.6 Stealthy Probing Attacks 
Another name for this attack is fingerprinting. Probing refers to methods for determining 
specific information about individual machines. Probing usually preludes more serious attacks 
and aims at determining the operating system or other unique identifiers of a system. Obtaining 
such knowledge allows attackers to launch specific attacks targeting specific operating systems. 











combination or when unexpected. For example, an unexpected TCP FIN packet will cause some 
systems to respond even though the correct action is to ignore the packet. Similarly, different 
operating systems will respond to such packets differently. Thus, by looking at the response to 
such packets, one obtains information that can help to identify the operating system of the 
machine of interest  [55]. 
Such attacks can be detected by the behavior observer component, which contains the 
EFSM of the targeted protocol. As we have mentioned earlier in the chapter on the formal 
model, a well-designed protocol EFSM treats unexpected packets at a certain state as an 
implementation error or an attack. In both cases, the system should not respond in such a way 
that helps attackers to determine the unique identifiers of the machine. Packets with strange flag 
combinations can be detected by the packet verifier component which guarantees adherence to 
protocol specifications. Both components do not require priori knowledge of patterns of such 
attacks. 
5.6.7 Ping of Death 
The Ping of Death is an ICMP echo request (ping) packet with an illegally long payload. 
The packet is specially crafted by an attacker to be of a size greater than 65535 bytes, which is 
the maximum IP packet size. Such packets can make the receiving host lock up or reboot when 
the buffer into which the incoming packet is stored overflows. 
Ping of Death can be detected by our packet verifier which ensures that all packets have 
the appropriate sizes. Clearly, an IP packet size that exceeds 65535 bytes violates protocol 
specifications. Therefore, detecting this attack does not entail priori knowledge of its signature. 
5.6.8 Teardrop 
This attack takes advantage of the fact that some vulnerable systems do not properly 
handle overlapping fragments. An attacker sends a series of IP packets carefully crafted to look 
like a normal packet that has been fragmented but such that the fragments overlap instead of 
being disjoint. Packet fragments are deliberately fabricated with overlapping offset 











a stack corruption or failure of the IP module on the host. 
Teardrop can be detected by our packet verifier which ensures that the second fragment 
of a packet specifies a fragment offset that resides within the data portion of the first fragment, 
and has a length such that the end of the data carried by the second fragment is short enough to 
fit within the length specified by the first fragment. Following protocol specification in the 
packet verifier component renders priori knowledge of this attack unnecessary. 
5.6.9 TCP Hijacking 
TCP hijacking takes advantage of the way a connection is established and a trust 
relationship between two machines A, and B. The attacker SYN floods machine B to make sure 
it does not respond to any packets from machine A. Then the attacker initiates a connection with 
machine A using a SYN packet spoofed to appear to be from trusted machine B. Machine A 
acknowledges the connection request from the presumed trusted machine accordingly. The 
attacker then sends an ACK packet with the correct sequence number to machine A using his/her 
real address, which results in a TCP connection established between machine A and the attacker. 
This sequence of events assumes that the attacker has previously determined the sequence 
number algorithm that A uses, and has determined the next sequence number that A will use. 
The issuance of CERT advisory CA-01-09  [56] shed some light on the issue of generating Initial 
Sequence Numbers (ISNs).  The CERT advisory points out that even if the ISN gets incremented 
with pseudo-random numbers, it is still possible to guess the increment, given enough attempts. 
The advisory points out that, given a series of ISNs, they will tend to fall around an “average” 
value over time, and given enough attempts, the attack could still guess an ISN. 
TCP hijacking can be foiled if the change in IP addresses is detected. If the TCP layer 
specifically looks back at the source address of the ACK packet and sees whether it is different 
from the source address of the SYN packet, the attack can be detected  [67]. Therefore, we create 
a signature in the state table representing the system state upon receiving the ACK packet which 
aims at establishing a connection. The procedure in the recommended action field performs 
cross-layer detection by using address information provided by the network layer, and 











11 shows the pseudo-code of the recommended action.  
Table 5-9. TCP Hijacking Attack Signature 
Field Name Field Content 
Protocol ID 26 
State ID 8 
State Name ACK Received 
Description 
The system state after receiving an ACK 
packet 
Threshold Null 
Time Unit Null 
Timer Null 
Recommended Action TCP-Hijacking_Procedure( ) 
Impact Such action causes TCP Session Hijacking 
 
Procedure TCP-Hijacking_Procedure ( ) 
                   SYN_Address = The source IP address of the SYN packet 
                   ACK_Address = The source IP address of the ACK packet 
      if SYN_Address == ACK_Address 
                          Enter ESTABLISHED state    // connection established 











                          Raise a TCP hijacking flag 
Figure 5-11. The Pseudo-code for TCP Hijacking Attack Detection. 
5.7 Attack Summary 
Table 5-10 recapitulates the attacks mentioned in the previous section. For each attack, 











Table 5-10. Lower Layers Attack Summary 
Attack Name Brief Description Violation Type 
UDP Storm A specially crafted UDP packet that causes 
two machines to attack each other. 
Protocol-Syntax 
Violation 
LAND Attack A specially constructed TCP packet with the 








Smurf Flooding a victim with ping requests. Protocol-Semantics 
Violation 
Stealthy Probing Sending packets with strange flag 
combination or when unexpected. 
Protocol-Semantics 
Violation 












TCP Hijacking Spoofing packet addresses to make a victim 
establish a TCP connection with the attacker 















5.8 Chapter Discussion 
In this chapter we followed the same systematic approach of the previous chapter to show 
how our design tackled lower layer threats. We started by mentioning the related protocols at the 
network and transport layer with their threat model. A discussion on how specifications for the 
related protocols were developed followed. The chapter then showed how the architecture 
originally designed for application layer protocols could be extended to accommodate lower 
layer protocols using the same principles. Nine different attacks targeting lower layer protocols 
were detailed to show the detection capabilities of the extended architecture. The next chapter 











Chapter 6 Implementation and Simulation 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded our discussion on the system design. The last two 
chapters detailed the design of our architecture discussing the system’s components and showing 
their role in the detection process. The attacks used to test the system were discussed along with 
the system detection capabilities.  
This chapter discusses the issues involved in the implementation and simulation of the 
proposed architecture. We start by mentioning some of the IDS implementation approaches 
followed by the hurdles that face the implementation and testing of intrusion detection systems 
in general. Then we introduce the main simulation concepts adopted by OMNeT++ simulator 
and how they can be used to overcome the hurdles. We also show how the simulator features are 
harnessed to implement the proposed architecture and launch the various attacks. We detail the 
simulated network in terms of topology and parameter settings and demonstrate the various 
traffic generation scenarios used to test the system 
6.2 Intrusion Detection Systems Implementation Approaches 
The way in which an IDS is implemented influences its operation and effect on the 
monitored resource greatly. Whether it is host-based or network-based, an IDS should not 
hamper the performance of the host or the network in a way that renders the users unhappy or 
unsatisfied. Some approaches to implementing IDSs are based on artificial intelligence such as 
neural networks and expert systems. Others are computationally based such as special purpose 
languages and Bayesian. Moreover, some are based on biological concepts such as immune 
systems and genetics. The rest of this section shows some of the most prevalent approaches to 
implementing IDSs and some examples of systems that have applied these approaches. 
6.2.1 Neural-based Intrusion Detection Systems 











classification of network activities based on incomplete and limited data sources. The system 
consists of a collection of processing elements that are highly interconnected. These highly 
interconnected processing elements transform a set of inputs to a set of desired outputs. The 
result of the transformation is determined by the characteristics of the elements and the weights 
associated with the interconnections among them. By modifying the connections between the 
nodes, the network is able to adapt to the desired outputs. In general, the neural network gains 
the experience initially by training the system to correctly identify pre-selected examples of the 
problem. The response of the neural network is reviewed and the configuration of the system is 
refined until the neural network’s analysis of the training data reaches a satisfactory level. In 
addition to the initial training period, the neural network also gains experience over time as it 
conducts analyses on data related to the problem. 
Neural network based IDSs are able to process data from a number of sources, predict 
events, and accept nonlinear signals as input. They are also fast and can perform supervised 
learning by mapping input signals to desired response. Furthermore, they can adapt weights to 
the environment, and be retrained easily. Moreover, they are fault tolerant and have a graceful 
degradation of performance if damaged. However, training of the neural network is required and 
enabling an industrial application requires complex hardware and software. If process conditions 
change from those used when training he neural network, data must once again be collected, 
analyzed, and used for retraining the system. 
Ryan, Lin, and Mikkulainen  [78] developed a keyword count based misuse detection 
system with neural networks. They presented the attack-specific keyword counts in network 
traffic to the neural network. Ghosh, Schwartzbard, and Shatz  [79] employed neural networks to 
analyze program behavior profiles instead of user behavior profiles. In this method the normal 
system behavior of certain programs is identified and compared to the current system behavior. 
6.2.2 Bayesian-Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
Bayesian logic is a branch of logic that is applied to decision making and inferential 
statistics that deals with probability inference. Bayesian inference uses the knowledge of prior 











experimental data can be established. It can also be used in data analysis when there is a need for 
extracting complex patterns from sizable amounts of information that contains a significant level 
of noise. It is considered very consistent and robust in the sense that small alterations in the 
model do not affect the performance of the system dramatically. It also allows combining expert 
knowledge with statistical data in a very practical way and the Bayesian networks can be 
constructed directly by using domain expert knowledge, without a time-consuming learning 
process. However, uncertainty may arise especially when the input parameters to an IDS are 
independent from one another and the number of parameters needed for defining the models is 
too high. 
Scott  [80] described a model-based approach to designing network intrusion detection 
systems using Bayesian methods. His approach considers general methods applicable to many 
different types of networks, using specific algorithms as examples. The central theme is that 
latent variable hierarchical models constructed using Bayesian methods lead to coherent systems 
that can handle the complex distributions involved with network traffic. Bayes’ rule provides a 
means of combining competing intrusion detection methods such as anomaly detection and 
pattern recognition. Bayesian methods present evidence of intrusion as probabilities, which are 
easy for human fraud investigators to interpret. Hierarchical models allow transactions to 
communicate information about possible intrusions across time and accounts. These hierarchical 
models contain a transaction level model describing how well individual network transactions fit 
user and intruder profiles, an account level model parameterizing bursts associated with network 
intrusion, and a network-level model that adjusts account level model parameters when an 
intrusion on one or more accounts is suspected. 
6.2.3 Special-Purpose Languages for Intrusion Detection 
Such systems are designed based on program behavior, which reduces false positive and 
false negative rates. Language rules are usually defined in terms of system resources and not 
attacks, which requires few updates while the program is running, and detection is usually done 
in real time. However, since the rules are based on a specific program version and since different 
versions of the application may access different resources, every version will require modified 











Sekar et al.  [81] identify network attacks by collecting and aggregating information 
across many network packets, and act on the basis of this information. Their implementation 
consists of a compiler and a runtime system. The compiler is responsible for translating the 
intrusion specifications into C++ code and performs type-checking for packet data types and the 
compilation of pattern-matching. Their pattern-matching is based on compiling the patterns into 
a kind of automaton in a manner analogous to compiling regular expressions into finite-state 
automata. The runtime system provides support for capturing network packets either from a 
network interface or from a file. 
Sekar et al.  [6] employ state-machine specifications of network protocols, and augments 
these state machines with information about statistics that need to be maintained to detect 
anomalies. They were able to show that protocol specifications simplify manual feature selection 
process that often plays a major role in other anomaly detection approaches. The specification 
language developed for modeling state machines made it easy to apply their approach to other 
layers such as HTTP and ARP protocols. 
6.2.4 Rule-Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
Rule-based IDSs including expert system-based IDSs provide consistent answers for 
repetitive decisions, processes and tasks. They hold and maintain significant levels of 
information, reduce employee training costs, centralize the decision making process, and reduce 
time needed to solve problems. They also reduce the amount of human errors and can review 
transactions that human experts may overlook. However, since they are rule-based, they need 
frequent updates to remain current. Furthermore, the acquisition of these rules is a tedious and 
error-prone process. They also lack human common sense, human creativity, and ability to adapt 
to changing environments. 
Ilgun, Kemmerer and Porras  [24] presented an approach to detect intrusions in real time 
based on state transition analysis. Their approach has been discussed earlier in this thesis as a 
model that is represented as a series of state changes that lead from an initial secure state to a 
target compromised state. The state transition graphs identify the requirements and represent 











transition analysis tool (STAT) is a rule-based expert system that is fed with the graphs. The 
authors developed USTAT which is a UNIX specific prototype of this expert system. In general, 
STAT extracts and compares the state transition information recorded within the target system 
audit trails to a rule-based representation of a known penetration that is specific to the system. 
6.2.5 Immune-Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
Immune based IDSs mimic the ability of the innate immune system to detect intrusions 
and stop them. They mimic the ability of the adaptive immune system to detect new types of 
intrusions that have not been seen before, and do not require a human expert to indicate that the 
intrusion is actually true. They have a faster response to previously seen intrusions and are 
distributed requiring no local coordination, which means that there is no single point of failure. 
Such system provides multi layer security as different mechanisms are combined to provide high 
overall security. The system is robust and goes through a dynamically changing coverage where 
cells die and others are reproduced to provide a random sample that can cover a larger space. 
However, the base models are simple since the actual human immune system is still under study 
and it lacks a theoretical foundation. 
Pagnoni and Visconti  [82] implemented a Native Artificial Immune System (NAIS), an 
artificial immune system for the protection of computer networks. Their system was able to 
distinguish between normal and abnormal processes. NAIS was also able to detect and protect 
web and FTP servers against new and unknown attacks and was able to deny access of foreign 
processes to the server. 
6.3 Hurdles Facing the Implementation and Testing of Intrusion 
Detection Systems 
There are several challenges that face the implementation and testing of intrusion 
detection systems. Some of these challenges are: 
1. Collection of attack scripts: An important aspect of the testing of any IDS is testing its 
ability to detect a wide range of attacks. Collecting a wide range of attack scripts and codes 











entails a considerable time and effort to adapt them to the particular testing environment. 
Once the script of an attack is identified, it must be reviewed, automated, and smoothly 
integrated into the testing environment. Such tasks could be very challenging due to the 
fact that these scripts are developed by different people with different technical 
backgrounds to work in different environments. 
2. Use of different tools to launch and detect attacks: Testing of intrusion detection 
systems usually involves two main phases. The first phase is to develop the intrusion 
detection algorithms and architecture using a specific tool. The second phase is to develop 
the attacks and scenarios necessary to test the system using a different tool. This separation 
of tools creates complications when it comes to integrating these tools to work together 
and into the specific testing environment. 
3. Generation of background traffic: Most IDS testing approaches can be classified in one 
of four categories with regard to their generation of background traffic  [10]. Each of these 
categories has its advantages and disadvantages. In the following we summarize the four 
approaches and the challenges they pose: 
• Testing using no background traffic: In such a scheme, an IDS is set up on a host 
or network on which there is no activity. Then, computer attacks are launched on this 
host or network to determine whether or not the IDS can detect the attacks. This 
approach is useful for verifying that an IDS has signatures for a set of attacks and 
that the IDS can properly label each attack. Furthermore, testing schemes using this 
approach are often much less costly to implement than the other approaches. 
However, such a scheme can neither say anything about false alarms, nor about the 
IDS ability to detect attacks at high levels of background activity  [68]. 
• Testing using real background traffic: This approach is very effective for 
determining the hit rate of an IDS given a particular level of background activity. Hit 
rate tests using this technique may be well received because the background activity 
is real and it contains all of the anomalies and subtleties of background activity. 











virtually impossible to guarantee the identification of all of the attacks that naturally 
occurred in the background activity which hinders false alarm rate testing. It is also 
difficult to publicly distribute the test since there are privacy concerns related to the 
use of real background activity  [69]. 
• Testing using sanitized background traffic: In this approach, real background 
activity is prerecorded and then sanitized to remove any sensitive data. This 
sanitization is performed to overcome the political and privacy problems of using, 
analyzing, and distributing real background activity. Then, attack data are injected 
within the sanitized data stream. Attack injection can be accomplished either by 
replaying the sanitized data and running attacks concurrently or by separately 
creating attack data and then inserting these data into the sanitized data. The 
advantage of this approach is that the test data can be freely distributed and the test is 
repeatable. However, sanitization attempts may end up either removing much of the 
content of the background activity thus creating a very unrealistic environment, or 
removing information needed to detect attacks  [70]. 
• Testing by generating background traffic: In this scheme, a test bed or simulated 
network is created with hosts and network infrastructure that can be successfully 
attacked. The simulated network includes victims of interest with background traffic 
generated by complex traffic generators that model the actual network traffic 
statistics. An advantage of this approach is that the data can be distributed freely 
since they do not contain any private or sensitive information. Another advantage is 
that we can guarantee that the background activity does not contain any unknown 
attacks since we created the background activity using the simulator. Therefore, false 
alarm rates using this technique are well-received. Lastly, IDS tests using simulated 
traffic are usually repeatable since one can either replay previously generated 
background activity or have the simulator regenerate the same background activity 












6.4 Implementation and Simulation Environment 
We use OMNeT++  [57] simulator as the platform for our design. OMNeT++ is an object-
oriented discrete event simulation tool that uses a modular structure. It may be used for traffic 
modeling of telecommunication networks, protocol modeling, and evaluating performance 
aspects of complex software systems among other things. 
An OMNeT++ model consists of hierarchically nested modules which communicate 
through message passing. OMNeT++ models are often referred to as networks. The top level 
module is the system module. The system module contains sub-modules which can also contain 
sub-modules themselves. The structure of models is shown in figure 6-1. The depth of module 
nesting is not limited which allows the user to reflect the logical structure of the actual system in 
the model structure. Modules that contain sub-modules are termed compound modules, whereas 
simple modules lie at the lowest level of the module hierarchy. Simple modules contain the 
algorithms in the model. 
System Module
Compound Module
Simple Module Simple Module Simple Module
 
Figure 6-1. OMNeT++ Model Structure. 
As previously mentioned, modules communicate by exchanging messages. In an actual 











arbitrarily complex data structures. Messages can arrive from another module or from the same 
module. When a message arrives from the same module it is called a self-message, and is usually 
used to implement timers. Simple modules can send messages either directly to their destination 
or along a predefined path through gates and connections. 
Gates are classified into output and input gates. Output gates are the interfaces through 
which messages are sent out, whereas input gates are the interfaces through which messages 
arrive. Connections are the links used to connect gates. Connections can be assigned three 
parameters which facilitate the modeling of communication networks. These three parameters 
are propagation delay (which is the amount of time the arrival of the message is delayed by 
when it travels through the channel), bit error rate (which specifies the probability that a bit is 
incorrectly transmitted and allows for simple noisy channel modeling), and data rate (which is 
specified in bits/second, and used for calculating transmission time of a packet). 
OMNeT++ uses two programming languages, namely NED (Network Description) 
Language and C++. NED language is used to describe the model structure and the topology of a 
network and its modules. A network description may consist of a number of component 
descriptions that can be reused in another network description, which facilitates the modular 
description of a network. On the other hand, C++ is used for the actual implementation of the 
simple modules such as messages and queues. The full flexibility and power of the programming 
language can be used, supported by the OMNeT++ simulation class library. The simulation 
programmer can freely use object-oriented concepts (inheritance, polymorphism, etc) and design 
patterns to extend the functionality of the simulator. Therefore, the design of a topology and the 
implementation of the modules that exist in the topology are separated. In addition, OMNeT++ 
provides a high degree of parameterization through the use of NED and initialization files and a 
solid support for Finite State Machines in the form of ready-to-use classes and functions. 
6.4.1 TCP/IP Modeling in OMNeT++ 
OMNeT++ support for TCP/IP protocols such as IP, ICMP, UDP, and TCP started with 
the Internet Protocol Suite (IPSuite), and has culminated in the more recent INET Framework. 











layered approach. The modularity that distinguishes OMNeT++ is reflected on the modeling of 
TCP/IP protocols, where all components of protocols are divided into a number of different 
modules, and each module can have several parameters. 
6.4.2 VoIP Protocols Modeling in OMNeT++ 
Several research groups at the University of Karlsruhe developed MMSim  [58] which is a 
model to simulate multimedia protocols using OMNeT++. The MMSim model provides support 
for SIP, RTP, and Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP). 
The actual details of each protocol are implemented in C++ programming language, 
where every major operation of the protocol is implemented as a member function in the class 
files that represent the protocol. All implementations of protocols follow the specifications 
detailed in relevant Request for Comment (RFC) documents. 
6.4.3 How OMNeT++ Can Be Used to Overcome the Implementation and 
Testing Hurdles 
C++ programming language can be exploited efficiently to implement attacks, which 
alleviates the burden of integrating attack scripts and codes written in different programming 
languages and styles into the testing environment. The full flexibility and power of the 
programming language, supported by the OMNeT++ class library can be used to implement 
protocol-related attacks. The same powerful features can also be used to implement both attacks 
and detection algorithms without the need to switch tools or products. Furthermore, OMNeT++ 
can generate background traffic that is guaranteed to be free of unwanted attacks, which gives 
credibility to hit rate and false alarm tests, and the test scenario is usually repeatable. 
6.5 Attack Implementation and Detection using the Simulator 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, attacks that target networked environments take 
advantage of vulnerabilities in networking protocols. Such attacks can be classified into (1) 
message flow attacks which are used by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the flow of 











constructing invalid messages, and (3) flooding attacks which are used by attackers to deny 
legitimate users access to network resources. 
In light of the above, we classify the implemented attacks based on the targeted protocols 
for implementation reasons. As mentioned earlier, protocols in OMNeT++ are implemented in 
an object-oriented manner as classes using C++ programming language. The main operations of 
each protocol are implemented as member functions in the class files. Therefore, we follow the 
same concept and implement protocol-related attacks as member functions in the class files that 
represent the protocol. 
Detection algorithms are implemented in some of the member functions that perform 
tasks related to the protocol operation. For instance, handleMessage(), which is a member 
function responsible for handling messages coming to the protocol, could be a good choice for 
the implementation of the detection algorithms responsible for checking the validity of the 
incoming messages and packets. 
All attacks are given identification numbers, which are stored in a system text file. The 
code that launches attacks (calls the member function that represents the attack) chooses a 
number randomly from the range of the identification numbers and launches the associated 
attack accordingly. Furthermore, the attack launching code itself is activated in the endpoints 
based on a randomly selected number that should exceed a certain threshold. This technique 
guarantees that the majority of the simulated network background traffic remains benign. Such 
techniques are made possible by the random number generation features provided by 
OMNeT++. OMNeT++ enjoys the support of several Random Number Generators that can be 
configured in the initialization files. 
Events in the simulator environment can be controlled to occur at a specific time. 
Message/event related functions can be used to send messages to other modules, schedule an 
event, or delete a scheduled event. This feature facilitates the detection and launching of attacks 
that require accurate timing such as flooding attacks, and message flow attacks. 
Message manipulation functions provided by protocol modules allow for creating 











functions to set the value of different fields and the length of the entire message. Similar 
functions can be used to get the value of message fields to perform detection. 
MMSim module provides interaction between SIP and RTP which makes cross-protocol 
detection at the application layer possible. RTP attributes can be captured by SIP through a 
specialized function that can be called from SIP module. In addition, messages in OMNeT++ 
have a field called control info that carries auxiliary information to facilitate communication 
between protocol layers which makes cross-layer detection possible. 
On the other hand, C++ streams which are associated with files are used to emulate our 
signature database. Functions that perform the recommended actions are given names that reflect 
the associated protocol and state. This way, functions are linked to records in the state table. 
When an administrator defines a function to perform a certain recommended action, he/she 
should store the function name in a system text file. When the detection process reaches a certain 
state of a protocol during a session, the IDS searches the system text file for the function name 
using a combination of the protocol and state ID. If the function name is found, it means that 
there is a function defined for that state of the protocol. Therefore, the IDS calls the function 
accordingly to perform the recommended action. More than one function can be defined for a 
single state of a protocol by adding different suffixes to the end of the function name. 
System files can also be used to aid the IDS in terms of performing stateful detection. 
Values of header fields of incoming packets are stored in temporary system files associated with 
sessions. Such files are named in a way that reflects the ID of the affiliated session, and the files 
contain records for the packets belonging to the active protocols of the session. This feature 
allows modules such as the Field Table to store signatures that span across multiple packets that 
could belong to different protocols. Since the relevant information is kept in these system files, 
the IDS can perform detection for the entire session or connection. Such system files get deleted 
automatically once the session is terminated. 
6.6 Network Topology and Configuration 
Figure 6-2 shows the simulated network topology. Our network comprises two domains 











(endpoints) which are connected to the servers by a 10Base-T Ethernet. Proxy servers and 
endpoints in each domain also run TCP-based server and client applications. TCP-based server 
and client applications simulate web users issuing HTTP requests. This setting of client and 
server applications is meant to emulate the operation and functionality of converged services. A 
converged service is an application that spans communications over multiple protocols to 






















Figure 6-2. Simulated Network Topology. 
For the VoIP application, we use the Audio/Video profile with minimal control 
(RTP/AVP), with UDP as the underlying protocol. An application profile describes how audio 
and video data may be carried within RTP. Our payload type is static with the identification 
number 10, and has the encoding L16. The payload type defines how a particular payload is 
carried in RTP. The clock rate, which is used to generate RTP timestamps, is 44100 Hz and the 
number of transmission channels is 2. Endpoints in a domain make calls to other endpoints in the 
other domain randomly and without predefined durations. The abovementioned parameter setting 
is recommended as one of the standard operating parameter settings for audio encoding and 
payload type  [74]. 











algorithm. We use a Maximum Segment Size (MSS) of 536 bytes per segment, and an advertised 
window of 7504 (MSS * 14) bytes. Similar to voice-based applications, TCP-based applications 
establish sessions with servers randomly, and sessions last for random durations. TCP Reno 
algorithm forms the base of the most modern TCP implementations and introduces major 
improvements over previous algorithms. Our choice of the Maximum Segment Size conforms to 
the default setting for TCP. TCP is designed to restrict the size of the segments it sends to a 
certain maximum limit to cut down on the likelihood that segments will need to be fragmented 
for transmission at the IP level. The Minimum Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) for IP 
networks is 576 bytes. All networks are required to be able to handle an IP datagram of this size 
without fragmenting. From this number, we subtract 20 bytes for the TCP header and 20 for the 
IP header, leaving 536 bytes which is the standard MSS for TCP  [75]. 
Our IDS is installed on all endpoints and servers in both domains. The Internet 
connection between the two domains is assumed to have a delay of 40 ms and a packet loss of 
0.2%. Such values for delay and packet loss are acceptable by most network Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) for backbone providers  [76]. 
6.7 Generated Traffic and Performance Tests 
The thesis aims include proving that the intrusion detection system can operate under 
different network conditions, adds little overhead to the network, and is robust. To do this, 
performance tests are conducted on the simulated network. The different conditions that are 
tested include a low-load scenario and a high-load scenario. The experiment runs under these 
two types of load with five different runs for each load. Each run lasts for 120 minutes which 
gives as an overall simulation time of 20 hours. The results which will be shown in the next 
chapter are averaged across the different runs and taken with and without the operation of the 
IDS to observe the difference. 
For the VoIP application, the tests that are performed under low-load conditions use 
background traffic sent at a frequency of 1 call per 15 seconds. The TCP-based applications use 
a background traffic sent at a frequency of 645 packets per minute under low-load conditions. 
















































Figure 6-4. Amount of TCP-Based Traffic under Low-Load. 
For the VoIP application, the tests that are performed under high-load conditions use 
background traffic sent at a frequency of 1.5 calls per 1 second. The TCP-based applications use 
a background traffic sent at a frequency of 3200 packets per minute under high-load conditions. 
Figures 6-5 and 6-6 show the calls captured at the proxy server and the packets captured at the 
















































Figure 6-6. Amount of TCP-Based Traffic under High-Load. 
In his critique of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA off-line intrusion detection as performed by 
Lincoln laboratories, McHugh  [90] criticizes the test traffic - including the background traffic 
and attack data – for (1) the lack of discussion on the data rate and its variation with time and (2) 
the presence of attacks in the training data. As mentioned clearly in this chapter, we address 
these two issues by providing the traffic rate under low- and high-load scenarios, and generating 












6.8 Chapter Discussion 
In this chapter, we introduced the reader to the simulation environment and how it was 
harnessed to implement the system. The advantages of our testing approach were highlighted. 
We also presented our simulated network with its parameters and settings. The two scenarios 
used to test the performance of the system were also shown. The next chapter will demonstrate 











Chapter 7 Results and Analysis  
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter shed some light on the simulation environment used to implement 
the proposed intrusion detection system. The chapter started by showing the different intrusion 
detection system implementation approaches alongside the hurdles that faced the implementation 
and testing of IDSs in real environments. It then showed the simulator features and how they 
were used to overcome the implementation and testing hurdles and implement both attacks and 
detection algorithms. The chapter then concluded by presenting the simulated network topology 
with its parameters, and the scenarios used to test the performance. 
This chapter will discuss the results produced by our system and analyze them. Our 
discussion on simulation results will revolve around two axes, namely, detection accuracy and 
performance evaluation. We will show how the IDS detects all the attacks presented, and provide 
an analysis of the causes of false alarms. We will also demonstrate quantitatively how the 
operation of the IDS has a minor impact on the performance of hosts and servers. 
7.2 Detection Accuracy 
7.2.1 IDS Coverage 
Assessing the coverage of intrusion detection systems is a challenging task with many 
ramifications. The coverage of any intrusion detection system depends on the attacks that the 
IDS can detect under ideal conditions. The number of dimensions that form each attack makes 
the assessment difficult. Each attack has a particular goal and works against particular software. 
Attacks may also target a certain version of a protocol or a particular mode of operation. 
Different sites may consider some attacks more important than others, which affects the 
assessment greatly. For instance, E-commerce sites may be very interested in detecting 












Table 7-1. Implemented Attacks with targeted Protocols and Effect 
Attack Name Protocols Involved Effect 
BYE Attack SIP, RTP Session Tear down 
Re-INVITE SIP,RTP Session Hijacking 
CANCEL SIP Denial of Service 
Malformed Messages All Protocols Denial of Service 
REGISTER Flooding SIP Denial of Service 
Voice Injection RTP Playing Artificial Stream 
UDP Storm UDP Denial of Service 
LAND IP, TCP Denial of Service 
Blat IP, TCP Denial of Service 
Smurf ICMP Denial of Service 
Stealthy Probing TCP Identifying OS 
Ping of Death ICMP Denial of Service 
Neptune TCP Denial of Service 
Teardrop IP Denial of Service 
TCP Hijacking IP, TCP Session Hijacking 
As stated in the first chapter of this thesis, we are neither interested in flaws in particular 
implementations of the protocols nor in vendor-specific protocols or protocol features. Instead, 
we are interested in generic protocol problems exploited by attackers to cause damage. 











protocols they target and the effect they have on the attacked system. 
There are several dimensions that can be taken from table 7-1. It is important to realize 
the diversity of the attacks used to test the system in terms of the protocols involved and the 
effect they have. The protocols involved range from application layer protocols such as SIP and 
RTP to network layer ones such as IP and ICMP. The wide range of supported protocols reflects 
the wide coverage of the intrusion detection system. Some attacks are cross-protocol which 
forms another dimension. As shown in the table, the effect of the attacks varies widely. The 
attacks violate many of the security services that should be provided by systems such as 
availability, confidentiality, authentication, and data integrity. Therefore, we can safely say that 
the abovementioned dimensions constitute the coverage of the IDS. 
7.2.2 IDS Hit Rate 
Generally, measuring the hit rate of an IDS is largely dependant on the set of attacks used 
during the test. Furthermore, intrusion detection systems can be configured in a way that could 
either favor detection of new attacks or minimizing false alarms. Table 7-2 shows all the attacks 
used to test the system during the experiment. With each attack, the table shows the number of 
instances launched during the experiment, the number of instances detected, and the module of 
the IDS responsible for detecting the attack. It is important to state that we have used the same 
configuration during testing for hit ates and false alarms. 
Table 7-2 shows how various components in the proposed architecture contributed to 
detecting all attacks launched during the experiment. Some of the attacks such as CANCEL, 
malformed packets, stealthy probing, ping of death, and teardrop were unknown to the IDS prior 
to the experiment. In other words, we did not encode any special signatures, and hence all 
detections for such attacks were based on normal behavior specifications. Our IDS has also 
identified all the detected attacks successfully by labeling them with names.  
It is important to realize that our IDS ability to detect attacks is not confined to the 
attacks used during the experiment. The implemented attacks are meant to represent a wide range 
of security service violations and attack categories. The proposed intrusion detection components 











Table 7-2. Hit Rate Results 





BYE Attack 6 6 State Table 
Re-INVITE 5 5 State Table 
CANCEL 3 3 Behavior Observer 
Malformed Messages 6 6 Packet Verifier 
REGISTER Flooding 3 3 State Table 
Voice Injection 4 4 State Table 
UDP Storm 2 2 Field Table 
LAND 7 7 State Table 
Blat 6 6 State Table 
Smurf 4 4 State Table 
Stealthy Probing 8 8 Behavior Observer and 
Packet Verifier 
Ping of Death 3 3 Packet Verifier 
Neptune 3 3 State Table 
Teardrop 5 5 Packet Verifier 












7.2.3 Probability of False Alarms 
Some of the difficulties surrounding the measurement of the false alarm rate can be 
attributed to the fact that intrusion detection systems may have different false alarm rates 
depending on the conditions of the underlying network environment. Furthermore, for intrusion 
detection systems that can be configured and tuned flexibly to control the rate of false alarms, it 
is always difficult to determine the ultimate configuration that should be used for a certain false 
positive test. In this part of the thesis, we mention some of the potential causes of false alarms in 
our design and show how the system overcomes them. 
1. Whenever the detection of an attack relies upon a certain order of packet arrivals within a 
predefined amount of time, there is a possibility of a false alarm. This phenomenon is due to 
network conditions and non-guaranteed delivery within a specific time window. During the 
experiment, we simulated false BYE and Re-INVITE attacks by delaying RTP packets in 
both after receiving a BYE message, and a Re-INVITE request respectively. Our IDS raised 
false flags on both occasions. We believe abnormal network conditions are to blame for 
these false positives, and not our detection mechanism. Delay as a result of propagation, 
handling, or queuing is a major issue in packet-based VoIP environments. However, our 
parameterized State Table can be used to overcome such situations. The choice of the values 
for timers is left to the discretion of the system administrator. Hence, system administrators 
can set these values in a way that reflects the conditions of the underlying network to avoid 
unwanted false alarms. It is relevant to mention that the same abnormal network conditions 
can result in false negatives. For example, in BYE attack, if the system does not receive any 
RTP packets within the life time of the timer due to network delays, it will miss the attack 
producing a false negative 
2. A major source of false alarms in intrusion detection is threshold detection. The goal of 
threshold detection is to record each occurrence of a specific event and detect when the 
number of occurrences of that event surpasses a reasonable amount that one might expect to 
occur within a specified time period. An unnaturally high number of occurrences within a 
short period of time may indicate an attack. Once the threshold number of occurrences is 











false alarms stems from the difficulty to identify the threshold number and the time frame 
for the specific event. These two parameters are highly dependent upon the security 
relevance of the event and the historical number of occurrences. Therefore, the choice of 
these values is often left to administrators  [9], which is the policy adopted by our system to 
reduce false alarms originating from threshold detection. The assumption here is that in a 
well-designed system, any alarm contains information. For example, one may see a few 
packets that look like a probe for vulnerable systems. The administrator may want to know 
about this, even though it is not yet a problem and even though in reality it may not be a 
prelude to an attack at all. In this scheme the system reports only alarms for events that are 
meaningful to administrators, and hence reduces the amount of false alarms significantly. 
The origins of this school of thought are discussed in detail in  [59]. 
3. We believe strict sticking to protocol specifications and standards might lead to some false 
alarms. In his paper about Bro system  [60], Vern Paxon mentioned what he called “The 
Problem of Crud”. Based on monitoring a large volume of network traffic, he realized that 
legitimate traffic exhibits abnormal behavior. He stated that the diversity of legitimate 
network traffic, including the implementation errors sometimes reflected within it, leads to a 
very real problem for intrusion detection, namely, discerning in some circumstances 
between a true attack versus an innocuous implementation error. He concluded by 
mentioning the difficulty of relying on “clearly” broken protocol behavior as definitely 
indicating an attack becaus  it very well may simply reflect the operation of an incorrect 
implementation of that protocol. As mentioned earlier in the section on specification 
development, our system uses more abstract specifications with the state machines 
concentrating on the essential details of each protocol and omitting the details that differ 
between different implementations of a protocol. We believe such an approach provides a 
satisfactory solution to the problem. 
4. The detection of some attacks depends on checking the source IP address of the incoming 
packets. We have already mentioned the example of TCP hijacking in a previous chapter. 
Another good example could be fake instant messaging. By faking the header of an instant 
message appropriately, the attacker can forge a message to A and mislead it into believing 











of the incoming messages and raise an alarm once the IP address of one of the messages 
changes. This direct methodology however, does not take the issues of mobility and user 
motion into account, which leads to false alarms. SIP fully supports the concept of user 
mobility. A user can make himself/herself available for communication by explicitly binding 
his/her Address Of Record (AOR) with a certain host address. This feature allows for user 
mobility since the user can register from any device that supports SIP including personal 
computers, wireless devices and cellular phones. We believe the flexibility provided by the 
threshold values and procedures in the recommended action fields in the state table can 
allow for mobility-aware detection. Our detection can take the rate of user mobility into 
account and allows for changes in the IP address according to a tuned rate of user motion.  
7.3 Performance Evaluation 
It is vital that any security measure to be implemented in a VoIP network does not 
impede the performance of the network. Quality of service (QoS) is very important to the 
operation of VoIP networks. The implementation of various security measures in a VoIP 
network can introduce some complications that can degrade QoS. These complications range 
from delaying call setups to delaying delivery of data packets. 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture, and show its 
effect on the hosts. Our discussion will focus on end-to-end delay, call setup delay, processing 
delay, packet loss, and memory usage at endpoints and servers. Since our IDS inspects 
individual packets and monitors the progress of sessions, it is expected to affect these 
performance parameters. 
7.3.1 End-to-end Delay 
End-to-end delay in VoIP refers to the time it takes for a voice transmission to go from its 
source to its destination. The ITU-T G.114 standard describes that a 150 milliseconds one-way 
delay is acceptable for high voice quality  [61]. Every element along the voice path adds to this 
delay. This includes switches, routers, and public Internet connections. Some delays such as 











constraint on the amount of security that can be added. A typical delay budget such as the one 
provided by Goode  [62], puts the cost of fixed delays at 121 milliseconds, leaving only 29 
milliseconds for various security implementations to compete for. 
Figure 7-1 shows the end-to-end delay experienced by an endpoint in the network with 
and without our IDS installed. The figure shows measured end-to-end delay for individual RTP 
voice packets (y-axis) versus simulation time (x-axis). The figure shows that during simulation, 
end-to-end delay, without the operation of the IDS, varies from 115 milliseconds to 134 
milliseconds. It is clear from the figure that the average end-to-end delay without the IDS is 
around 120.0 milliseconds. On the other hand, end-to-end delay with the operation of the IDS 
varies from 117 milliseconds to 136 milliseconds. From the figure, the average end-to-end delay 
with the IDS is around 122.7 milliseconds. Therefore, our IDS adds about 2.7 milliseconds on 
average to the voice transmission delay.  
Figure 7-2 shows a similar measurement of end-to-end delay versus time with emphasis 
on the operation of the signature database. From the figure, end-to-end delay is averaged around 
122.672 milliseconds when the signature database is disabled, whereas it is averaged around 
122.727 milliseconds when the signature database is enabled. Therefore, the operation of the 
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Figure 7-1. End-to-end Delay. 











two figures, the overall delay remains considerably less than the upper bound of 150 
milliseconds despite the 40 milliseconds delay on the Internet connection. The delay variation 
(jitter) remains around 2 milliseconds with a slight addition of 1.6 * 10-5 seconds by our IDS. 
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Figure 7-2. End-to-end Delay with the Effect of the Signature Database. 
7.3.2 Call Setup Delay 
Call setup delay in VoIP environments is the period that starts when a caller dials the last 
digit of the called number and ends when the caller receives the last bit of the response. VoIP 
systems are expected to give a performance comparable of that of PSTNs. Users may be annoyed 
with a setup process that requires more than a few seconds. 
Figure 7-3 shows the call setup delay introduced by our IDS at a certain endpoint during 
the simulation. The figure shows measured call setup delay for 60 calls initiated by the endpoint 
(y-axis) versus simulation time (x-axis) with and without our IDS installed. The figure shows 
that during simulation, call setup delay, without the operation of the IDS, varies from 242 
milliseconds to 253 milliseconds. From the figure, the average call setup delay without the IDS 
is around 248.5 milliseconds. On the other hand, the call setup delay with the operation of the 
IDS varies from 310 milliseconds to 320 milliseconds. From the figure, the average end-to-end 
delay with the IDS is around 315.6 milliseconds. Therefore, the hybrid IDS adds about 67.1 
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Figure 7-4. Call Setup Delay with the Effect of the Signature Database. 
Figure 7-4 shows a similar measurement of call setup delay versus time with emphasis on 
the operation of the signature database. From the figure, call setup delay is averaged around 
313.597 milliseconds when the signature database is disabled, whereas it is averaged around 
315.642 milliseconds when the signature database is enabled. Therefore, the operation of the 
signature database adds about 2.04 milliseconds on average to the call setup delay. 
The call setup delay increases by 1.3% on average under high-load. Such an increase in 
the call setup time is tolerable by VoIP users. Furthermore, the overall call setup delay remains 











7.3.3 Processing Delay 
End-to-end and call setup delays can be affected by another important factor which is 
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Figure 7-6. Processing Delay with the Effect of the Signature Database. 
We show in figure 7-5 the processing delay at an endpoint with and without our IDS. The 
figure shows measured processing delay for individual packets (y-axis) versus simulation time 











IDS, varies from 1800 microseconds to 5588 microseconds. From the figure, the average call 
setup delay with the IDS is around 2429 microseconds. On the other hand, the processing delay 
without the operation of the IDS varies from 1700 microseconds to 4147 microseconds. From the 
figure, the average processing delay without the IDS is around 2325 microseconds. Therefore, 
our IDS adds about 4.4% increase to the processing delay on average. 
Figure 7-6 shows a similar measurement of processing delay versus time with emphasis 
on the operation of the signature database. From the figure, processing delay is averaged around 
2359 milliseconds when the signature database is disabled, whereas it is averaged around 2429 
milliseconds when the signature database is enabled. Therefore, the operation of the signature 
database adds about 70 microseconds on average to the processing delay. 
The processing delay increases by 0.8% under high-load. An important observation that 
can be taken from the figures is the processing spikes indicating extra processing time needed for 
certain packets. When a spike exceeds the incoming packet rate, there is the danger of packet 
drops. 
7.3.4 Packet Loss 
High sending rates can lead to packet drops especially in UDP-based transmissions. 
Unlike TCP, UDP lacks built-in transmission control mechanism that makes senders adapt 
themselves to the buffer capacity of receivers. The absence of such a mechanism in UDP could 
lead to a situation where the receiver is unable to keep up with the high sending rate of the 
sender, which results in some packet drops from the receiver’s buffer. Another contributing 
factor to packet loss is processing spikes. Processing spikes mean that the CPU is spending too 
much time on some packets which has the consequence of missing subsequent ones.  
It is important to mention that packet loss does not only happen due to transmission 
errors. Based on practical experiences, it has been found that buffer overflow is a major cause of 
packet loss. Such buffers may be in network hardware (e.g. switches and routers) or in operating 
systems. Consequently, packet loss does not only happen in networks. Buffers of hosts in a 
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Figure 7-7. Packet Loss. 
Ideally, there should be no packet loss for VoIP. Losses of 3 and 4 percent could place 
the quality in VoIP networks encoded by certain codecs at a level below the quality of service 
level of PSTNs. Figure 7-7 shows the packet loss rate at servers and endpoints buffers with and 
without our IDS. The figure shows the percentage of packet loss (y-axis) versus the various 
amounts of traffic (x-axis). Without the operation of the IDS, the system starts without packet 
drops till the number of packets exceeds 10000. Then, the loss percentage grows linearly to 0.02 
as the number of received packets exceeds 15000. Thereafter, the packet loss percentage 
stabilizes around 0.035% till the number of packets reaches 45000. The loss percentage climbs to 
and stabilizes around 0.05% for packet rates greater than 75000. 
On the other hand, when the IDS operates on the host, the loss percentage starts at about 
0.035% and increases linearly to around 0.05% as the number of received packets reaches 
22000. Thereafter, the loss percentage stabilizes around 0.055% as the number of received 
packets surpasses 75000. 
From figure 7-7 and the abovementioned discussion, we conclude that the packet loss 
rate with our IDS is only 0.02 % higher than the rate without it on average. The overall packet 
loss remains at 0.05% on average, which is considerably less than the 1 percent level specified 
by many codecs as the upper limit. The figure does not show a separate curve for the operation 
of the signature database because its effect could not be distinguished from the effect of the 











7.3.5 Memory Usage 
Measuring the memory consumption of an intrusion detection system is vital in gauging 
its effect on the host. Some IDSs could exhaust all the available memory after a relatively short 
runtime, leaving the host with the possibility of crashing. We find that two factors dominate 
overall memory consumption, namely, the total amount of state kept by the system and the traffic 
volume. In order to understand the memory usage of a host intrusion detection system, we need 
to track where it stores the state. Therefore, we have identified the IDS’s main data structures 
and added methods to track their size during simulation. 
 Figure 7-8 shows the memory usage at a server under high-load of traffic. The figure 
shows the amount of memory consumed by the IDS (y-axis) versus simulation time (x-axis). The 
figure exhibits the gradual increase in memory consumption as call and session establishment 
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Figure 7-8. Memory Consumption. 
Memory consumption at the server starts at 96.2 KB and grows linearly till it reaches 3.8 
MB as the simulation time passes the 40 minutes mark. The figure shows a surge in consumption 
that brings the amount of consumed memory to 6 MB. The surge can be attributed to a sudden 
increase in the number of connection and session establishments. Thereafter, the amount of 
consumed memory is decreased to remain around 4 MB as 1 hour of simulation time elapses. 











before the overall consumption stabilizes around 10 MB. Such a figure is acceptable considering 
the plenty amounts of memory enjoyed by servers these days. Section 7.3.6 of this thesis 
describes how the IDS can efficiently decrease and curb the amount of consumed memory.   
7.3.6 Performance Enhancers 
The good performance figures shown by our architecture can be attributed to three main 
factors:  
1. We use a flexible state management policy to curb the system’s memory consumption. For a 
stateful IDS, it is vital to limit the overall memory requirements for state management to a 
tractable amount. The amount of memory required for connection state is determined by two 
factors: (i) the size of each state entry, and (ii) the maximum number of concurrent, still 
active connections. The flexible options provided by the State Table allow administrators to 
limit the number of new connections arriving at a host and consequently the amount of 
memory required by these connections. Allocating memory dynamically as required by new 
connections can lead to crashes due to memory exhaustion. Furthermore, the same flexible 
options in the State Table can be used to implement timeouts to improve state expiration. 
The procedures in the Recommended Action Field can be used to flush a connection’s state if 
for some time no new activity is observed. Such procedures can even override the default 
values of timers provided by the protocol specifications, which helps the system to restore 
memory occupied by practically inactive connections. 
2. The Behavior Observer implements finite state machines in switch-like (case) statements, 
which makes memory management efficient. Considering the cost of creating objects, there 
is no need in this scheme to create a new object for each transition or state in the finite state 
machine. Information that identifies calls and sessions uniquely can be stored at the cost of a 
few hundred bytes per entry. This low cost allows servers to accommodate hundreds of calls 
and sessions simultaneously without degrading the performance of the system.  
3. Retrieving from the database requires going through only one level of hierarchy. 
Specification-based modules directly retrieve from Field and State tables which contain the 











Recommended Action Field of the database for a single record. Therefore, the database can 
store in one record multiple signatures with slight variations. 
7.4 Chapter Discussion 
In this chapter, we showed and analyzed the results produced by our intrusion detection 
system in terms of detection accuracy and performance evaluation. Our discussion on detection 
accuracy addressed the IDS coverage, hit rate, and how our design went about solving the 
problem of false alarms. We presented the wide coverage of the IDS by highlighting the various 
protocols supported by the system and the different violations of security services our IDS was 
able to detect. Consequently, the IDS was able to detect all the attacks launched during the 
experiment. We demonstrated how our design empowered system administrators to reduce false 
alarms with the flexible options available in both specification-based and signature-based 
modules. 
The chapter also presented quantitatively the effect of the IDS on the operation of servers 
and endpoints. Some of the vital parameters in VoIP networks and endpoints, such as end-to-end 
delay, call setup delay, processing delay, packet loss, and memory usage, were chosen for the 
discussion, and the minor impact of the IDS on these parameters was clearly shown. The next 















Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions 
This thesis started with clarifying the threats surrounding VoIP environments and 
showing the various security challenges facing service provisioning in such environments. That 
start constituted the prelude towards proposing a hybrid host-based intrusion detection system 
that is suitable for VoIP environments. The hybridism of our proposed intrusion detection system 
is the result of combining specification-based and signature-based approaches. The two detection 
approaches join forces to detect attacks targeting various network layers such as application, 
transport, and network layer. 
The specification-based modules of our IDS are based in part on the Communicating 
Extended Finite State Machines model (CEFSMs), where each protocol is represented as an 
Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM). On the other hand, our signature-based modules are 
based in part on State Transition Analysis Techniques, where attacks are modeled as a sequence 
of actions leading from a system safe state to a compromised one.  
Both specification-based and signature-based detection modules provide stateful and 
cross-protocol detection to enhance the system’s efficiency. EFSMs representing monitored 
protocols maintain the state of a session and allow state to be collected from multiple requests 
and responses that constitute an entire session or connection. Furthermore, EFSMs exchange 
detection information in real-time to help the IDS to deal with cross-protocol attacks and make 
more accurate decisions. The use of State Transition Analysis Techniques in our signature-based 
detection module allows for the modeling of state-aware signatures. In addition, signatures that 
cross protocol and layer boundaries can be stored efficiently in our signature database. 
This thesis has proposed vital improvements to the traditional State Transition Analysis 
Techniques. These improvements enable our signature database to model attacks that are 
difficult to model using similar State Transition Diagram-based approaches, such as Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks. The improvements come in the form of configurable detection settings to 











procedures to tackle more complex attacks. 
Our system’s adoption of the Communicating Extended Finite State Machines model 
allows specification-based detection modules to detect violations of protocol semantics. 
Furthermore, the improved State Transition Analysis Techniques enable our signature database 
to store semantics-aware attack signatures. Syntax violations are also taken care of by a certain 
specification-based module, and a dedicated table in the signature database. 
We have implemented and tested the proposed architecture using the network simulator 
OMNeT++. OMNeT++ simulator is used to implement the detection modules and the attacks 
used to test the hit rate. It is also used to collect various results with regard to the system 
performance under various loads of traffic. The features possessed by OMNeT++ simulator 
allow us to flexibly implement the detection methodologies discussed earlier and launch various 
attacks against certain targets in the simulated network. We have presented in this thesis the 
advantages of our approach to using a simulated environment and how it can be used to 
overcome the hurdles of implementing and testing IDSs. 
We have demonstrated in this thesis how the hybrid intrusion detection system has 
detected all the implemented attacks using the proposed detection methodologies. The 
implemented attacks are meant to be diverse in terms of the protocols involved and the security 
services violated. Some of the attacks target higher application layer protocols, whereas others 
target lower layers such as transport and network layer. Some of the attacks violate data 
availability and confidentiality, whereas others violate authentication and data integrity. We have 
also shown how the proposed IDS can flexibly overcome the causes of false alarms. 
We have proven in this thesis that the operation of the proposed hybrid intrusion 
detection system has a trifling impact on the quality of service provided by the network. We have 
numerically assessed the effect of the architecture on vital system parameters such as end-to-end 
delay, call setup delay, processing delay, packet loss, and memory usage. The outcome of that 













This thesis has made the following contributions to intrusion detection research in VoIP 
environments: 
• We have proposed a novel and efficient combination of specification-based and signature-
based detection approaches. Both detection approaches are well-known for their accurate 
detection and low false alarm rate. Therefore, their combination is expected to achieve the 
goal of improving the intrusion detection experience in general and bringing false alarms 
to their lowest level. Based on the experimental results which show accurate detection and 
identification of all the launched attacks along with a low false alarm rate, we can safely 
say that we have succeeded in achieving the abovementioned goal. The use of 
specification-based approaches simplifies the process of feature selection which has 
proven to be a hard problem in anomaly-based approaches. Furthermore, the use of 
signature-based approaches allows the system to detect attacks that are not based on 
repetition, which have proven to be challenging in anomaly-based approaches. 
• This thesis has introduced vital improvements to State Transition Analysis Techniques 
which are used to model intrusions and penetrations. As discussed earlier in this thesis, 
State Transition Analysis uses State Transition Diagrams (STDs) to represent attacks. 
Despite the remarkable convenience STDs provide for attack modeling, they fall short of 
representing complex and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Our proposed improvements 
have addressed these shortcomings. Firstly, the detection procedures attached to attack 
signatures have the capacity to predict and detect quite complex attacks such as cross-
protocol ones. They can also take obfuscation resistance capabilities of State Transition 
Analysis one step further by tackling different types of intermediate states that represent 
variants of the attack. Secondly, the flexible detection parameter setting provided with 
attack signatures allows administrators to customize the IDS based on the security 
relevance of events and underlying network conditions. These two improvements enable 
our signatures to be flexible enough to detect variants of the same attack and tight enough 











• Our signature database overtakes other signature databases by introducing the state model. 
This feature enables our database to store a higher-level abstraction of attacks than 
previous works and support more general signatures. It also brings semantics-awareness to 
attack modeling by using state transition diagrams which allow us to represent attacks at 
the session level rather than lower and semantics-less levels. Furthermore, the state model 
allows for a tight integration with specification-based approaches that are based on 
Extended Finite State Machines. 
• This thesis presented an evaluation framework based on a network simulator. The 
framework can be used to generate attacks and implement detection methodologies. It can 
also be used to collect various results aiming at assessing the performance aspects of 
intrusion detection systems. As discussed earlier in this thesis, the framework can be 
reliably used to test both the hit rate and false alarm rate of intrusion detection systems. 
Considering the fact that there are not many instances of VoIP attacks available in public 
databases and the difficulty of customizing available attacks, our framework can be used 
for future research in this area. 
8.3 Future work and Recommendations 
In the following, we present some issues for consideration for future work in the field of 
intrusion detection systems in VoIP environments: 
• The simulated network in this research included two domains. Future research involving 
the investigation of the performance of the intrusion detection system for several domains 
can demonstrate the behavior of the system for large networks. Furthermore, more 
applications with more protocols at various layers can be added to take our tests a step 
further. 
• In the previous chapter, we made a mention of “The Problem of Crud” which faces 
intrusion detection systems. Considering the diversity of legitimate network traffic, 
including the implementation errors sometimes reflected within it, the IDS may find it 











implementation error. What worsens the problem is the reliance of IDSs on strict 
specifications that do not consider implementation differences. Although we have 
addressed this issue in this thesis by relying on more abstract specifications in our 
specification-based modules, we believe there is still some room for improvement. This 
improvement can come in the form of an intelligent mechanism that adopts fuzzy logic to 
help specification-based modules to be more flexible. A good reason fuzzy logic is 
introduced for intrusion detection is that security itself includes fuzziness  [65]. Classical 
approaches in intrusion detection define a range value or an interval to denote a normal 
value. Then, any values falling outside the range are considered anomalies regardless of 
their distance to the interval. Unfortunately, this causes an abrupt separation between 
normality and anomaly. Fuzzy logic helps smooth this abrupt separation and produces 
more general rules which will increase the flexibility of the IDSs. The runtime impact of 
introducing fuzzy logic rules in our specification-based modules should also be evaluated 
thoroughly. 
• We showed previously in this thesis that some of the attacks could be detected at the 
attacker side (CANCEL attack). We can envisage a situation where the attacker is an 
insider with bad intentions. Although it is possible to mount a defense by using stand-alone 
intrusion detection systems on each host, a more effective defense can be achieved by 
coordinating and cooperating among intrusion detection systems across the network. 
Coordinating and cooperating among IDSs will help limit the damage of attacks such as 
the abovementioned. When it comes to coordination and cooperation among IDSs, a major 
issue is to define data format and exchange procedures for sharing information of interest. 
A possible start might be some of the work of the IETF Intrusion Detection Working 
Group  [66], which focuses on standards to support interoperability. These guidelines could 
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Appendix B: Diagrammatic Representation for Some of 
the Implemented Attacks and Detection Methodologies 
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Appendix C: NED File for Simulated Network 
import   
    "Router",  
    "EtherSwitch", 
    "sipHost", 
    "sipReg",  
    "sipProxy";  
                 
channel Internet 
    delay 40ms; 




    delay 15ms; 
    error 1e-8; 
    datarate 10*1000000; 
endchannel                 
  
module simpleNetModule  
                        
    parameters:  
        debug : bool;  
                       
    submodules:  
        client1: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA1",  
  localUser = "User1", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client1.irt";  
                                              
            display: "i=image-uac;p=67,80;b=32,32"; 
      
      
        client2: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA2",  
  localUser = "User2", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client2.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=64,141;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
      
      
        client3: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA3",  
  localUser = "User3", 











                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client3.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=64,213;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
        client4: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA4",  
  localUser = "User4", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client4.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=64,250;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
        client5: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA5",  
  localUser = "User5", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client5.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=64,260;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
        client6: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA6",  
  localUser = "User6", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,   
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client6.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=120,80;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
        client7: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA7",  
  localUser = "User7", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client7.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=120,141;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
        client8: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA8",  
  localUser = "User8", 











                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client8.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=120,213;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
        client9: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA9",  
  localUser = "User9", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client9.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=120,250;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
 
 
        client10: sipHost;  
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "UA10",  
  localUser = "User10", 
                aktAsServer = false,  
                portNumber = 5060,  
                numOfPorts = 2,  
                routingFile = "client10.irt";  
                                              
            display: "p=64,260;b=32,32;i=image-uac"; 
      
      
        proxy1: sipProxy; // 
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "1st Proxy",  
                routingFile = "proxy1.irt",  
                numOfPorts = 2;  
            gatesizes:  
                in[1],  
                out[1]; // 
                        // 
            display: "i=device/server_l;p=161,176;b=40,24"; 
 
        registrar1: sipReg; // 
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "1st Registrar",  
                routingFile = "reg1.irt",  
                numOfPorts = 1;  
            gatesizes:  
                in[1],  
                out[1]; // 
                        // 
            display: "i=device/server_l;p=161,186;b=40,24"; 
      
      
        proxy2: sipProxy; // 
            parameters:  











                nodeName = "2nd Proxy",  
                routingFile = "proxy2.irt",  
                numOfPorts = 2;  
            gatesizes:  
                in[1],  
                out[1]; // 
                        // 
            display: "i=router;p=249,176;b=32,32"; 
 
        registrar2: sipReg; // 
            parameters:  
                debug = debug,  
                nodeName = "2nd Registrar",  
                routingFile = "reg2.irt",  
                numOfPorts = 1;  
            gatesizes:  
                in[1],  
                out[1]; // 
                        // 
            display: "i=device/server_l;p=249,186;b=40,24"; 
 
        switch1: EtherSwitch; 
            gatesizes: 
                in[8], 
                out[8]; 
            display: "p=100,236;i=switch2"; 
 
        switch2: EtherSwitch; 
            gatesizes: 
                in[8], 
                out[8]; 
            display: "p=200,236;i=switch2"; 
      
      
        router1: Router;  
            display: "p=161,59;b=32,15;i=ipc"; 
      
      
        router2: Router;  
            display: "p=249,59;b=32,15;i=ipc"; 
      
 
    connections:  
        router1.out++ --> Internet --> router2.in++; 
        router1.in++ <-- Internet <-- router2.out++; 
 
        switch1.out[0] --> ethernetline --> client1.in; 
        switch1.in[0] <-- ethernetline <-- client1.out; 
        switch1.out[1] --> ethernetline --> client2.in; 
        switch1.in[1] <-- ethernetline <-- client2.out; 
        switch1.out[2] --> ethernetline --> client3.in; 
        switch1.in[2] <-- ethernetline <-- client3.out; 
        switch1.out[3] --> ethernetline --> client4.in; 
        switch1.in[3] <-- ethernetline <-- client4.out; 
        switch1.out[4] --> ethernetline --> client5.in; 
        switch1.in[4] <-- ethernetline <-- client5.out; 
        switch1.out[5] --> ethernetline --> proxy1.in; 
        switch1.in[5] <-- ethernetline <-- proxy1.out; 
        switch1.out[6] --> ethernetline --> registrar1.in; 











        switch1.out[7] --> ethernetline --> router1.in++; 
        switch1.in[7] <-- ethernetline <-- router1.out++; 
 
        switch2.out[0] --> ethernetline --> client6.in; 
        switch2.in[0] <-- ethernetline <-- client6.out; 
        switch2.out[1] --> ethernetline --> client7.in; 
        switch2.in[1] <-- ethernetline <-- client7.out; 
        switch2.out[2] --> ethernetline --> client8.in; 
        switch2.in[2] <-- ethernetline <-- client8.out; 
        switch2.out[3] --> ethernetline --> client9.in; 
        switch2.in[3] <-- ethernetline <-- client9.out; 
        switch2.out[4] --> ethernetline --> client10.in; 
        switch2.in[4] <-- ethernetline <-- client10.out; 
        switch2.out[5] --> ethernetline --> proxy2.in; 
        switch2.in[5] <-- ethernetline <-- proxy2.out; 
        switch2.out[6] --> ethernetline --> registrar2.in; 
        switch2.in[6] <-- ethernetline <-- registrar2.out; 
        switch2.out[7] --> ethernetline --> router2.in++; 




network simpleNet : simpleNetModule  
    parameters:  













Appendix D: Initialization File for Simulated Network 
[General] 
network = simpleNet 
ini-warnings = false 
preload-ned-files = *.ned @../../../nedfiles.lst 






module-messages = no 




*.debug = true 
simpleNet.proxy1.localIp = "10.0.0.1" 
simpleNet.proxy1.cmdFileName = "proxy01.cmd" 
simpleNet.proxy1.localUser = "" 
simpleNet.registrar1.localIp = "10.0.0.2" 
 
simpleNet.proxy2.localIp = "10.0.10.1" 
simpleNet.proxy2.cmdFileName = "proxy02.cmd" 
simpleNet.proxy2.localUser = "" 
simpleNet.registrar2.localIp = "10.0.10.2" 
 
simpleNet.client1.localIp = "10.0.0.10" 
simpleNet.client1.useProxy = "10.0.0.1" 
simpleNet.client1.cmdFileName = "client01.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client2.localIp = "10.0.0.15" 
simpleNet.client2.useProxy = "10.0.0.1" 
simpleNet.client2.cmdFileName = "client02.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client3.localIp = "10.0.0.20" 
simpleNet.client3.useProxy = "10.0.0.1" 
simpleNet.client3.cmdFileName = "client03.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client4.localIp = "10.0.0.25" 
simpleNet.client4.useProxy = "10.0.0.1" 
simpleNet.client4.cmdFileName = "client04.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client5.localIp = "10.0.0.30" 
simpleNet.client5.useProxy = "10.0.0.1" 
simpleNet.client5.cmdFileName = "client05.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client6.localIp = "10.0.10.10" 
simpleNet.client6.useProxy = "10.0.10.1" 
simpleNet.client6.cmdFileName = "client06.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client7.localIp = "10.0.10.15" 
simpleNet.client7.useProxy = "10.0.10.1" 
simpleNet.client7.cmdFileName = "client07.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client8.localIp = "10.0.10.20" 











simpleNet.client8.cmdFileName = "client08.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client9.localIp = "10.0.10.25" 
simpleNet.client9.useProxy = "10.0.10.1" 
simpleNet.client9.cmdFileName = "client09.cmd" 
 
simpleNet.client10.localIp = "10.0.10.30" 
simpleNet.client10.useProxy = "10.0.10.1" 
simpleNet.client10.cmdFileName = "client010.cmd" 
 
 
# RTP Parameter 
*.portNumberRTP  = 2 
*.profileNameRTP = "RTPAVProfile" 
*.bandwidthRTP  = 44100 
*.payloadTypeRTP = 32 
*.fileNameRTP  = "../Data/moving.mpg.gdf" 
*.autoOutputFileNames = true 
 












**.client*.tcpApp[0].numRequestsPerSession = 3500 
**.client*.tcpApp[0].requestLength = truncnormal(350,20) 




















# tcp settings 
**.tcp.mss = 536 





















# ARP configuration 
**.arp.retryTimeout = 1 
**.arp.retryCount = 3 
**.arp.cacheTimeout = 100 
 
# NIC configuration 
**.ppp[*].queueType = "DropTailQueue" # in routers 
**.ppp[*].queue.frameCapacity = 100  # in routers 
 
# hook names 
**.qosBehaviorClass = "EnqueueWithoutQoS" 
 
# nam trace 
**.nam.logfile = "trace.nam" 
**.nam.prolog = "" 
**.namid = -1  # auto 
 
 
